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The Empire of Death: How Culture
and Economics Affect Informed
Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and

Japan
George J. Annast and Frances H. Miller*

I.

INTRODUCTION
American culture reflects a paradox: the more openly we discuss death and its
inevitability, the more money we spend to postpone and deny it. Sherwin Nuland's
book How We Die,' a frank description of the way our bodies deteriorate with and
without medical intervention, topped the New York Times best seller list in the spring
of 1994. At the same time, Jack Kevorkian, arguably the world's best known physician, was being acquitted of violating Michigan's law against assisted suicide, while
a Michigan commission was debating legislative changes to permit physicians to
help their terminally ill patients kill themselves. Despite such open discussion of
death and expansion of the informed consent doctrine, U.S. medical expenditures at
the end of life remain astronomically high.2 Most of this elevated spending is attributable to new medical technology.
In J.G. Ballard's Empire of the Sun, 3 the United States, British and Japanese
cultures are contrasted through the eyes of a young British boy incarcerated by the
Japanese army in China during World War II. Ballard describes "the emergence of a
particularly American world out of the failures of two traditionally dominant forms of
social authority." 4 British society was organized according to rigid social class
structure and Japanese society was based on the cult of the emperor, but as the war
progressed, Japan and the United Kingdom found their traditional power relationships undermined. On the other hand, the more egalitarian United States attained
world dominance through the use of death-producing atomic technology. The British boy learned not only that power is arbitrary, but also that his survival required
"absolute submission to the conditions of power."5
t J.D., M.P.H., Edward R. Utley Professor of Health Law, Boston University Schools of Law,
Medicine, and Public Health; Director, Law, Medicine & Ethics Program, Boston University.
4 J.D., Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law and Professor of Public
Health, Boston University School of Public Health.
Troyen Brennan, Peter Davis, Leonard Glantz, Dean Hashimoto, David Hughes, Wendy
Mariner, Naoko Miyaji, and the members of the University of Texas and Boston University
Law Schools' faculty colloquia made valuable comments on earlier drafts.
'SHERWIN NULAND, How WE DIE (1993).
2
See generally A.A. Scitovsky, "The High Cost of Dying" Revisited, 72 MILBANK Q. 561
(1994); A.A. Scitovsky, The High Cost of Dying: What do the Data Show?, 62 MILBANK Q.
591 (1984).
3
J.G. BALLARD, EMPIRE OF THE SUN (1984).
"Dennis A. Foster, J.G. Ballard's Empire of the Senses: Perversion and the Failure of
Authority, 108 PUBLICATIONS MOo. LANGUAGE Ass'N AM. 519, 527 (1993).
5Id. at 528.
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Death and technology still remain linked in all three cultures, but this link now
appears more evident in medicine than in the military where it was historically central. Medicine has even adopted military metaphors as its own. Physicians speak of
fighting invaders with a massive armamentarium, of giving orders, and of practicing
medicine on the front lines.6 The U.S.'s Human Genome Project now splits the gene
to forge links to life, much as science once split the atom and forged links to death.
The United States now concentrates its research efforts on this death-defying
technology rather than on the death-producing technology that drove so much of
our economy during the Cold War era. The United Kingdom and Japan, by way of
contrast, use death-defying technology much less frequently. In the British and
Japanese cultures, people seem to fear end of life less, yet the idea of death is hidden
from public discourse. Preoccupation with the manner of death and with the use of
ever-improving medical technology to postpone death is not apparent. In part as a
consequence, their health care costs are less than half of ours, and are relatively
stable, while those of the United States continue to escalate.
It may not be surprising that medical power-the authority of physicians and
the potency of medicine-appears arbitrary to many patients. But U.S. patients no
longer necessarily accept that their survival depends on their submission to medical
technology. The law's doctrine of informed consent seeks to tame both death and
arbitrary medical intervention to the will of the individual. Nonetheless, many Americans spend much of their time and many of their health care dollars attempting to
prevent death by unproven means.
Historically, most Americans have treated health care as a private commodity
whose price, and therefore availability, is primarily determined by market forces. In
such a context, the law not unsurprisingly places a high premium on information
disclosure by physicians. Personal autonomy-an individual's power to choose
among medical options-enjoys its most zealous protection under U.S. jurisprudence.7 The dominant U.S. version of informed consent is grounded on principles of
patient/consumer autonomy, and seems to enhance market choice. But a strong
theme of collectivism now runs through some discussions of U.S. health policy.8
President Clinton was elected at least in part because he promised Americans universal health insurance coverage, but that promise has been all but abandoned, at
least for the short-run. Moreover, unless health care funding increases dramatically,
universal coverage would force limits on services that insured Americans are accustomed to receiving. This raises the politically charged specter of rationing.9 The
6 See George J. Annas, Refraining the Debate on Health Care Reform by Replacing Our
Metaphors, 332 NEw ENG. J. MED. 744 (1995); SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS A METAPHOR, 57
(1978); SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS (1989).
7
See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 445 (1982). Cf.
Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Medical Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications,
112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 949, 953 (1990) (patient autonomy has highest value in hierarchy of principles of medical ethics).
8
See, e.g., TROYEN BRENNAN, JUST DOCTORING, MEDICAL ETHICS IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1991);
Symposium, The "Oregon Plan", 1 HEALTH MATRIX 135 (1991); H. Denman Scott et al.,
Universal Insurance for American Health Care: A Proposal of the American College of
Physicians, ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 511 (1992). See also Symposium, Managed Competition:
Health Reform American Style?, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993.
'The term rationing is used in this article in its popular sense to denote care which
could conceivably confer medical benefit, but which is withheld for economic rather than
clinical reasons. In fact, the U.S. has always rationed health services, but we do so by
relegating the uninsured to the margins of health care delivery systems, rather than by
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rationing theme may also be detected in a handful of reported legal opinions. 0 The
patient sovereignty central to informed consent doctrine in the U.S.'s death-denying society poses serious obstacles to this collective trend. In countries where
health care is publicly financed, disclosure requirements are much less explicit, and
local law may actually discourage doctors from revealing information about diagnosis, prognosis, and alternative forms of treatment.
We theorize in this Article that the content and the style of imparting medical
information can profoundly affect a country's total health expenditures." We believe a society's general attitude toward death (as well as other cultural influences),
will shape the type and amount of information that individual patients receive. In
this Article we explore the cultural role and the economic impact of telling patients
the truth about what doctors actually know-or don't know-about their medical
conditions, and about therapy that might help (but could also harm) them. We
concentrate particularly on truth-telling concerning prognosis when life-threatening illness has been diagnosed, because this dramatic case most clearly reveals
systemic values."2 The analysis focuses on the United States, with comparisons to
informed consent law in the United Kingdom 3 and Japan. 4 We look specifically at
the cultural determinants of medical practice in each country in Part II, and at the law
which affects physician-patient interaction in Part III. We believe that a society's
cultural attitude toward death strongly affects its approach to health sector finance,
and we explore that interplay in Parts IV and V. These factors in turn influence the
information the law requires doctors to provide their patients/consumers.
Finally, we conclude in Part VI that what doctors truthfully tell U.S. patients
about prognosis and treatment alternatives, and about the degree of scientific uncertainty associated with their illnesses, will affect the way health service allocation
takes place in the future. We suggest that when U.S. patients are more honestly
withholding specific services from insureds. Cf. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985)
(past experience makes it easier for us to tolerate excessive services than to limit providing
them).
10See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
There are some especially costly forms of treatment that may reasonably be
excluded from the [Medicaid] program in order to preserve the assets in the pool
and extend its benefits to the maximum number of needy persons. Fiscal considerations may compel certain difficult choices in order to improve the protection afforded to the entire benefited class.
Id. at 355. Cf. Julia Field Costich, Note, Denial of Coverage for "Experimental" Medical
Procedures: The Problem of De Novo Review Under ERISA, 79 Ky. L.J. 801 (1990-91).
1l For example, patient treatment choices vary when the same information is presented
in terms of probability of death, rather than possibility of survival. Barbara J. McNeil et al., On
the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982).
12This article will not directly examine the ramifications of informing patients when
the financial or technical resources required to provide treatment that might benefit them
are unavailable, but see generally, Mark Hall, Informed Consent to Rationing Decisions, 71
MILBANK Q. 645 (1993); Frances H. Miller, Denial of Care and Informed Consent in English
and American Law, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1992).
1' On recent health sector reorganization in the U.K., see Patricia Day & Rudolf Klein,
Britain's Health Care Experiment, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1991, at 39.
14 On health sector organization in Japan, see MILTON 1. ROEMER, NATIONAL HEALTH SYSTEMS
OF THE WORLD, VOL. 1: THE COUNTRIES 153-61 (1991).
See also, John K. lglehart, Japan's
Medical Care System (pts. 1 & 2), 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 807, 1166 (1988); Naoki lkegami,
Japanese Health Care: Low Costs Through Regulated Fees, 10 HEALTH AFF. 87 (1991); Aki
Yoshikawa, et at., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a Universal Health
Care System, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV., Fall 1991, at 111.
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informed about prognosis, and about the negative aspects of many aggressive therapies, public perceptions about the definition and desirability of limiting health services-particularly, but not only, for terminal illness-will change. We also examine
the implications for Japan and the U.K. should they adopt U.S. technology and
informed consent rules.
II. CULTURE AND MEDICAL SCIENCE
The definition of good medical care varies enormously from country to country.1" For example, German and French physicians for decades routinely prescribed
government-financed "spa cures" for their patients. 16 Such therapy choices would
invite professional scorn, not to mention malpractice litigation, and would not be
covered by insurance if prescribed by U.S. doctors. The international medical community often disagrees significantly about appropriate diagnosis and treatment. 7
Most physicians are relatively ignorant, if not openly skeptical, about scientific
findings reported from foreign countries."
At a more fundamental level, medical experts often frankly disagree about what
constitutes disease. 9 Many physical states defined and treated as worthy of medical intervention in the U.S., such as moderately elevated blood pressure, are considered unremarkable variations of the human condition elsewhere in the world. 20 By
way of contrast, low blood pressure is treated as a medical disorder in Germany2
while at the same time it is welcomed as a longevity indicator in both the U.S. and the
U.K.2 2 American travelers becoming ill in foreign countries are often surprised to
learn that 98.60 is not necessarily the gold standard for normal body temperature,
notwithstanding what they have been led since childhood to believe. 23 Far from
15 LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE & CULTURE (1988) [hereinafter MEDICINE & CULTURE]; cf. THE
RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE FOR MEDICINE (Leon Eisenberg & Arthur Kleinman eds., 1981); E.
Phelps, Diffusion of lnformation in Medical Care, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1992, at 23.
IS German patients have been entitled to six-week insurance-paid stays at health spas
every three years. Richard A. Knox, Germany's Health Care: A Model, BOSTON GLOBE,
October 25, 1992, at 71, 73. German health reforms recently eliminated spa coverage,
however. Health Budget Using European Models Promising for United States, ProPAC
Told, PENS. & BEN. DAILY (BNA), April 14, 1993. For a general description of the German
system, see MICHAEL ARNOLD, HEALTH CARE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1991).
7

" MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15, at 96, reports neurosis as the leading diagnosis by
British GPs. Neurosis was not even mentioned in the top twenty diagnoses in Germany for
the same time period, presumably stemming from German cultural hostility to psychiatry.
"1A.M.W. Porter, Three Threats to Standards of Medical Practice, I LANCET 1071, 1071
(interviews with French and British doctors reveal that they rarely read each others' medical journals). British doctors tend to be empiricists distrustful of theory per se, while
French doctors are trained as Cartesian thinkers, tending to dismiss empiricism as riskily
anecdotal. See MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15, at 37-44.
"See LYNN PAYER, DISEASE MONGERS: How DOCTORS, DRUG COMPANIES, AND INSURERS ARE
MAKING YOU FEEL SICK 1-100 (1992) (how the U.S. "creates" disease).
20 See, e.g., Lawrence K. Altman, U.S. Seeks Attack on Hypertension, N.Y. TIMES,
October 31, 1992, at 5.
2 MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15, at 25 ("low blood pressure [is] treated with
eighty-five drugs as well as hydrotherapy and spa treatments in Germany").
22 See James M. Robbins et al., Treatment for a Nondisease: The Case of Low Blood
Pressure, 16 Soc. SCI. & MED. 27 (1982).
23 In the U.K. for example, thermometers are calibrated to show 96.4' as normal body
temperature. Cf., Should Physicians Abandon 98.60 as a Standard of Normal Body Temperature?, INTERNAL MED. WORLD REP., October 15-31 1992, at 1.
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being an "exact" science with commonly acknowledged definitional, diagnostic, and
treatment principles, scientific uncertainty permeates medicine.24
Professional cultural values also both overtly and subliminally prejudice medical practice, as do the cultural values imbedded in the particular society in which
physicians practice their skills. 5 Moreover, patients have culturally influenced
attitudes of their own that affect their willingness to accept-as well as their response to receiving-medical therapy.26 The Jehovah's Witness" and Christian
Science2" cases, as well as the abortion controversy, 29 have spotlighted religion's
powerful influence on receptiveness to medical intervention in the U.S. and elsewhere. Less immediately obvious cultural influences can have an equally strong
impact on patient perception of medical risks and benefits.30
The U.S. public has always been culturally predisposed toward action in the
face of threatened adversity, medical or otherwise." Lynn Payer's masterful book
Medicine & Culture,32 quoting such odd bedfellows as Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Luigi Barzini, links the aggressive American approach toward medicine to the frontier spirit, 33 and to Americans' deeply ingrained belief that "the main purpose of a
24 David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty, HEALTH AFF.,

Summer 1984, at 74. Cf., Franz Inglefinger, Arrogance, 303 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1507 (1980).
25 For example, the Gallic ideal of the (slim) feminine form prompts French plastic
surgeons to counsel breast reduction for the same patients who could-at least until the
recent controversy over silicone implant safety-be plausible candidates for breast augmentation in the U.S.'s more curvaceously inclined cultural milieu. Cf. Fashion World
Should Look at Real Women; the Surgeon's Version, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1992, at A20;
Robert M. Veatch, Consensus of Expertise: The Role of Consensus of Experts in Formulating Public Policy and Estimating Facts, 16 J. MED. & PHIL. 427 (1991) (values of medical
experts differ from values of lay people). See generally MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15;
Klim McPherson, International Differences in Medical Care Practices, in OECD SOCIAL
POLICY STUDIES No. 7, HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION: THE SEARCH FOR EFFICIENCY 17 (Organization
for Economic Co-Operation and Development ed., 1990).
6
" ARTHUR KLEINMAN, PATIENTS AND HEALERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE, (1980). Cf Nancy
Scheper-Hughes, Social Indifference to Child Death, 337 LANCET 1144, 1145 (1991) ("Parents and public officials throughout the world have often failed to see infant and child
[illness or] death as either a personal tragedy or an important social issue.").
27In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972) (competent patient may refuse life-saving
blood transfusion where no compelling state interest involved); cf In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (blood transfusion
ordered despite patient's religious refusal to consent, because "[t]he state, as parens patriae,
will not allow a parent to abandon a [seven month-old] child ....
").
28 Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971) (Christian Scientist mental patient
challenged forced administration of tranquilizers, citing constitutionally protected religious beliefs).
29 Cf ROEMER, supra note 14, at 90.
30
Mary DOUGLAS, RISK ACCEPTABILITY AND SOCIAL SCIENCES (1985).
3" Kerr L. White, Foreword to MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15, at 10, 11; Rudolf
Klein, Rationing Health Care, 289 BRIT. MED. J. 143, 144 (1984) ("America is a perfectibility of man society in which illness and debility are seen as challenges to action and patients
tend to be demanding consumers.").
32 MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15.
"How could a people which . . . has contrived the Bowie knife and the revolver . . .
which insists in sending out yachts and horses and boys to outsail, outrun, outfight and
checkmate all the rest of creation; how could such a people be content with any but 'heroic'
practice? What wonder that the stars and stripes wave over doses of ninety grains of
sulfate of quinine and that the American eagle screams with delight to see three drachms of
calomel [a potent purge] given at a single mouthful?" 9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE WRIT-
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man's life is to solve problems." 34 For decades Americans have tolerated-if not
encouraged-the delivery of superfluous medical services under the rubric of medical necessity, financed by cost-pass-through health insurance.35 However, escalating health care costs, a sometimes stagnating economy, increased patient awareness
of the hazards of medical intervention, and the dubious success of modern technology in prolonging dying have prompted at least some reevaluation of an indiscriminately aggressive approach to medical care.
Cost containment pressures are bringing home the lesson that medical necessity is actually a fluid notion, continually reconceived as scientific understanding,
payment incentives, and culture evolve. 36 Containing costs necessarily implies
setting limits on health care expenditures, and cultural values are critical to determining where those limits will lie. 37 When the 70,000-member American College of
Physicians advocated caps on national health expenditures in September of 1992, a
sea-change in professional values (at least among primary care physicians) gained
public visibility. 3 When an ultimately successful presidential candidate ventured
to include spending caps in his pre-election agenda for health sector reform, one can
be sure that at least he tested the political winds before proposing such a radical
change in the status quo.39 Those winds shifted dramatically in the interim, but
while the opposition was mobilizing, the candidate was elected.
III. CULTURE AND INFORMED CONSENT
In this section we examine the legal doctrine of informed consent in three widely
differing national cultures: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. We
analyze the theory and function of informed consent through the lens of death in
each country, to understand why the amount of information physicians give their
patients/consumers can affect the way health resource allocation takes place. While
we concentrate on these three countries, we believe the analysis can be applied to
other industrialized nations as well.
Although we focus here on choice involving treatment alternatives, choice in
medicine occurs at two preliminary stages as well. First, health "insurance plans"
are selected either by or for patients. Second, patients pick their personal physi(1888), quoted in MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra
note 15, at i27.
' LUIGI BARZINI, THE EUROPEANS 239 (1983).
35 STARR, supra note 7, at 434; HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ,
THE PAINFUL
PRESCRIPTION: RATIONING HOSPITAL CARE 4 (1984).
" For general background, see generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY
LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1979); John B. McKinley, From "Promising
Report" to "Standard Medical Procedure": Seven Stages in the Career of a Medical
Innovation, 59 MILBANK Q. 374 (1981); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 86-91 (1983).
Moreover, many Americans may be beginning to perceive that cost containment is the
price they must pay for broader-or even continued-access to health insurance coverage.
" Daniel Callahan, The Oregon Initiative: Ethics and Priority Setting, 1 HEALTH 'MATRIX
157 (1991); Leslie Pickering Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1881 (1992); Michael J. Garland, Setting Health Care Priorities in
Oregon, I HEALTH MATRIX 139 (1991); David C. Hadorn, The Problem of Discrimination in
Health Care Priority Setting, 268 JAMA 1454 (1992); Paul T. Menzel, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care: A Commentary, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1919 (1992).
38Scott et al., supra note 8, at 511.
3' Bill Clinton, The Clinton Health Care Plan, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 804, 805, (1992).
INGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, MEDICAL ESSAYS
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cians from among those sanctioned by their plan. Each of these decisions is subject
to cultural influences, which may determine the range of alternatives available. In
countries with single-payer systems, the government controls the total budget for
health services, thereby limiting those services that can be supplied to everyone.
Under the U.K.'s National Health Service (NHS), for example, the patient's primary
care physician is expected to function as gatekeeper to medical specialists, who
generally will treat patients only on referral.4 0
In insurance-based systems like those in the U.S. and Japan, citizens can usually go directly to the doctor of their own choosing, although in the U.S. that range
of choice is now commonly limited by the patient's managed care insurance contract. In all systems the specific treatment decision itself, however, including the
decision to refuse treatment, is made within the confines of the particular physicianpatient relationship. We concentrate on the amount of information each country's
law requires doctors to convey within this relationship, especially when life-threatening illness occurs, as a vehicle for examining the interplay among financing; cultural attitudes toward death, and choice.
A.

THE UNITED STATES

A British physician has described the United States as "the land of freedom,
democracy, self-reliance, and market competition."'" This description is reflected in
the modern U.S. version of informed consent, which itself can be traced to the early
part of the twentieth century. As an Illinois court put it in 1906:
Under a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest right
which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his person, in
other words his right to be himself, is the subject of universal acquiescence,
and this right necessarily forbids a physician ... to violate without permission the bodily integrity of his patient by a major or capital operation.42
Initially, United States judicial opinions described the requirement of consent to
medical treatment as necessary to avoid the intentional tort of battery. By the 1970s,
however, courts had begun to reformulate the physician's duty to inform as a negligence concept, required by the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship.
Doctors had been telling patients relatively little, and informed consent became
recognized as necessary to promote "shared decision-making."43 It soon became
not only a legal doctrine promoting self-determination, but a core ethical principle as
40 The U.K. General Medical Council's principles of professional conduct state, "a
specialist should not usually accept a patient without reference from the patient's general
practitioner." (UK) GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE: FITNESS
To PRACTICE 22 (1991). For a description of the NHS internal market reforms initiated in
1991, see Frances H. Miller, Competition Law and Anticompetitive Professional Behavior
Affecting Health Care, 55 MoD. L. REV. 453, 460 (1992).
4'John Fay, The Mouse and the Elephant: Can Primary Care Save the U.S. Health
System?, 340 LANCET 594 (1992).
42 Pratt v. Davis, 118 I11.
App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 244 Ill. 30, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
41Not so coincidentally, the Medicare and Medicaid programs, initiated pursuant to the

Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396v (1988 & Supp. V 1993)), made the issue of choice meaningful
to a large segment of the population which previously had limited access to health services.
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well. 4 Informed consent requirements implement the fundamental principle that
"adults are entitled to accept or reject health care interventions on the basis of their
45
own personal values and in furtherance of their own personal goals.
California courts, especially the California Supreme Court, have been the nation's
most influential in shaping the U.S. doctrine of informed consent. The California
Supreme Court decided the case of Cobbs v. Grant46 in the wake of the consumer,
civil rights, and women's movements of the 1960s. In Cobbs a patient had sued his
physician for failure to disclose the inherent risks of ulcer surgery: a splenectomy
and the development of an additional ulcer later occurred. The court abandoned the
battery theory, and replaced it with a negligence cause of action, holding that the
physician owed the patient an affirmative duty to disclose certain information. This
duty could not be derived from practices customarily engaged in by other reasonably prudent physicians, since few surgeons then disclosed this type of risk information to their patients. Rather, the court found the duty inherent in the fiduciary
47
nature of the doctor-patient relationship.
Under the Cobbs rule, the ultimate choice among alternative treatments, like all
other marketplace decisions, rests with the patient-consumer. Just as banks must
disclose annual percentage interest rates to depositors and borrowers, and used car
salesmen must disclose actual mileage to buyers, so physicians must disclose risks
and alternatives of proposed medical procedures to patients. A market system
presumes that individual decisions will be based on consumer information. Informed consent doctrine assumes that the patient's doctor is the appropriate person
to provide this information, and requires disclosure so that the patient can be a
4
knowledgeable consumer of the medical product.
Most recently, the California Supreme Court refused to redefine the required
content of informed consent, and its opinion in Arato v. Avedon 49 underlines the
44

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 2-3 (1982).
41 Id. See also GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 83-85 (2d ed. 1989).

The other candidate for leading U.S. case is Canterbury v.
46 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972).
Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). We prefer Cobbs because the California courts have
continued to refine it.
' In supporting the patient's right to decision-making authority, the court noted the
patient's "abject dependence" on the doctor for medical information. This dependency,
coupled with the trust the patient must have in their doctors, generated the physician's
duty to disclose. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 9. The hospital settled, but the case against physician
was never retried because the plaintiff's lawyer believed that his client could not meet the
objective "reasonable person" causation standard. The court also used the concept of
materiality to identify the information that physicians must disclose; material information is that which might lead a reasonable person to reject the recommended therapy (and
opt for an alternative or no treatment at all). The California Supreme Court specifically
required the following pieces of information to be disclosed (others would be added later): a
description of the proposed procedure, its risks (of death and bodily harm) and benefits
(including probability of success), alternative treatments (including no treatment) with
their risks and benefits, and problems associated with recuperation. Id. at 10-11.
41Since 1972 the California Supreme Court has also required physicians to inform
patients of the risks of refusing screening tests such as Pap smears. Truman v. Thomas,
611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980). It has also mandated that doctors inform patients about potential financial conflicts of interest which might influence them to make recommendations
influenced by personal reasons unrelated to their patients' best interests. Moore v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
49 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
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difficulty we still have in dealing with death. Miklos Arato, a forty-three-year-old
electrical contractor, was operated on to remove a nonfunctioning kidney on July 21,
1980. During surgery a tumor was found in the tail of his pancreas, and doctors
removed the tumor along with the surrounding tissue and lymph nodes. Several
days later, the surgeon met with Mr. Arato and his wife. He told them that he
thought he had excised all of the tumor and referred them to an oncologist. The
surgeon did not tell them that only about five percent of patients with pancreatic
cancer survive for five years, nor did he give Mr. Arato a reasonable estimate of his
life expectancy. The oncologist told the Aratos that there was a substantial chance
of a recurrence, and that a recurrence would mean that the disease was incurable. He
recommended experimental chemotherapy and radiation treatment, acknowledging
that this might produce no benefit. The oncologist was not asked for, and did not
volunteer, a prognosis.
In the following April, while the chemotherapy and radiation treatment were
continuing, the cancer recurred. Even though the physicians believed Mr. Arato's
life expectancy could then be measured in months, they did not tell him so. Mr.
Arato died on July 25, 1981, approximately one year after doctors diagnosed his
disease. His wife and two adult children then brought suit against the surgeons and
oncologist, alleging that they had an obligation under California's informed consent
doctrine to tell Mr. Arato, before asking him to consent to chemotherapy, that approximately ninety-five percent of people diagnosed with pancreatic cancer die within
five years. 50 The plaintiffs argued that the statistical prognosis should have been
disclosed because it indicated that even with successful treatment Mr. Arato would
probably have lived only a short time. 5 If Mr. Arato had known the facts, the
plaintiffs believed, he would not have undergone the rigors of the experimental treatment. He would instead have chosen to live out his last days at peace with his wife and
family, and would have made final arrangements for his financial and business affairs. As a result of his ignorance he was induced not to so plan; his contracting
business had gone bankrupt, and his estate incurred substantial tax losses.
On the basis of standard California jury instructions on informed consent requirements, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the physicians. 2 A California
50At trial it was shown that at the first meeting with his oncologist, Mr. Arato had
filled out an eighteen-page questionnaire in which he answered "yes" to the question: "If
you are seriously ill now or in the future, do you want to be told the truth about it?" The
physicians who treated Mr. Arato justified their nondisclosure of the statistical prognosis
on a variety of grounds, most based on traditional medical paternalism. His surgeon, for
example, thought Mr. Arato had shown such great anxiety about his cancer that it was
"medically inappropriate" to disclose specific mortality rates. The chief oncologist said
he understood that patients like Mr. Arato "wanted to be told, but did not want a cold
shower." He thought that reporting extremely high mortality rates might "deprive a
patient of any hope of a cure," and that this was medically inadvisable. His physicians also
said that during his seventy visits with them over a one-year period, Mr. Arato had avoided
ever specifically asking about his own life expectancy and that this indicated that he did not
want to know the information. In addition, all the physicians testified that the statistical
life expectancy of a group of patients had little predictive value when applied to a particular patient. See, George J. Annas, Informed Consent, Cancer, and Truth in Prognosis, 330
NEw ENo. J. MED. 223 (1994).
1The physicians measured success in terms of added months of survival. Arato v.
Avedon, I1 -Cal. Rptr. 2d 169, 172 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
32 The instructions read by the trial judge stated:
Except as hereinafter explained, it is the duty of the physician to disclose to the
patient all material information to enable the patient to make an informed
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court of appeals reversed the decision in a two-to-one opinion, stating that physicians have an obligation to disclose life expectancy statistics to patients so that
they may take timely action to plan the financial and other aspects of their deaths.53
The defendant-physicians then appealed.
Instead of taking the opportunity to resolve what the California Supreme Court
described as a "critical standoff' in the development of informed consent doctrine
between the extremes of absolute patient sovereignty and medical paternalism, the
court focused on one very narrow question, and upheld the trial court. It analyzed
whether California's standard jury instructions should be revised to require the
specific disclosure of a patient's life expectancy, as predicted by mortality statistics. 54 Framing the question so narrowly made answering it relatively easy. The
court described the physician-patient relationship as "an intimate and irreducibly
judgment-laden one" that had to be judged within "the overall medical context." As
for general statistics on life expectancy, the court found them of little use to individual patients. The court thought, for example, that "statistical morbidity values
unreliable and offer
derived from the experience of population groups are inherently
55
little assurance regarding the fate of the individual patient.
decision regarding proposed treatment.
Material information is information which the physician knows or should
know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's
position when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure.
To be material a fact must also be one which is not commonly appreciated.
A physician has no duty of disclosure beyond that required of physicians of
good standing in the same or similar locality when he or she relied upon facts
which would demonstrate to a reasonable person that the disclosure would so
seriously upset the patient that the patient would not have been able to rationally weigh the risks of refusing to undergo the recommended treatment.
Even though the patient has consented to a proposed treatment or operation, the failure of the physician to inform the patient as stated in this instruction before obtaining such consent is negligence and renders the physician subject to, liability for any damage legally resulting from the failure to disclose or
for any injury legally resulting from the treatment if a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would not have consented to the treatment if he or
she had been adequately informed of the likelihood of his [sic] premature death.
Arato, 858 P.2d at 602 n.3.
3 Arato, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
'Arato, 858 P.2d at 598.
55Perhaps most important, the court described this case as one that was "fairly litigated" and properly put in the hands of "the venerable American jury," which had rendered
a reasonable verdict that it was not prepared to second-guess. The court concluded:
Rather than mandate the disclosure of specific information as a matter of law,
the better rule is to instruct the jury that a physician is under a legal duty to
disclose to the patient all material information-that is, "information which . . .
would be regarding as significant by a reasonable person in the patient's position
when deciding to accept or reject a recommended medical procedure"-needed to
make an informed decision regarding a proposed treatment.
Id. at 607. The patient's desire to be told the truth, as evidenced by his answer on the
questionnaire, was found to be irrelevant, since the physician has an independent legal duty
to tell the "truth" (although a patient can waive the right to information). The court also
dealt with the issue of expert testimony, noting that in addition to the information required
to be disclosed by Cobbs (the nature and benefits of the proposed treatment, its risks of
death or serious harm, reasonable alternatives and their risks, and problems of recuperation), physicians must also disclose any other information which another skilled practitioner would disclose. The court ruled that specific data on life expectancy fell within this
standard. Thus, the defendant physicians were properly permitted to call expert medical

THE EMPIRE OF DEATH

If the only issue is whether the law should require physicians always to disclose
statistical life-expectancy data to critically ill patients as part of the informed consent process, the court's conclusion is defensible and perhaps unavoidable. But
this issue is much too narrow a basis for refining the informed consent decision. Standing alone, statistical probabilities of survival may indeed not be material for an
individual patient. Statistical probabilities become material, however, if they indicate whether the particular patient is likely to survive, or predict that patient's probable quality of life with and without treatment. The informed consent issue thus
centers on disclosure of proposed treatment success rates concerning both survival
prospects and quality of life for the specific individual. This is the type of material
information patients have a right to know under Cobbs-not only because it concerns their bodies, but, more importantly, because it concerns their lives.56
Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in Arato did not argue the necessity for explaining
success rates, because then the result could have (and should have) been different.
In Cobbs, which Arato affirms, the California Supreme Court had said:
A medical doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the
procedure he is prescribing, the risks of a decision not to undergo the
treatment, and the probability of a successful outcome of the treatment ....
The weighing of these risks against the individual subjective fears and
hopes of the patient is not an expert skill. Such evaluation and decision is
57
a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone.
This language explicitly -requires physicians to explain the probability that a
proposed treatment will be successful, and implicitly requires the physician to tell
the patient what the physician means by "success." In Arato, the court correctly
concluded that the disclosure of a statistical life-expectancy profile of all pancreatic
cancer patients, by itself, was not required to inform Mr. Arato properly of his
prognosis. However, such information can be invaluable when coupled with an
explanation of why the physician thinks the patient's case is or is not typical. Group
data are the basis for predictions in individual cases, including both treatment recommendations and statements about probable risks and benefits. Mr. Arato's physicians relied on group data, for example, when they told him that if his cancer
recurred it would be incurable. The court should have made clear that a reasonable
person would consider it material to know not only the probability of success of a
proposed treatment, but what the doctor means by success. Without this information the physician, not the patient, really makes the treatment decision. This result
is precisely what the doctrine of informed consent is designed to prevent.
End-of-life care will come under increasing scrutiny as expanded health insurance coverage makes cost control an even more dominant concern of U.S. medical
policy. Approximately thirty percent of the Medicare budget is now spent on treatment during the last year of its beneficiaries' lives. Significant savings could be
achieved by decreasing utilization within that period. 5" Congress had both cost
witnesses to testify that it was not standard practice in the medical community in 1980 to
disclose specific life-expectancy data.
56 Alexander M. Capron, Duty, Truth and Whole Human Beings, HASTINGS CTR. REP.,

Aug. 1993, at 13-14. See also,

ANATOLE BROYARD, INTOXICATED BY MY ILLNESS
NOLL, IN THE FACE OF DEATH (1989).
"
"

(1992);

PETER

Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972).
See Peter A. Singer & Frederick H. Lowy, Rationing, Patient Preferences, and Cost
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containment and autonomy objectives in mind when it passed the Patient Self-Determination Act 9 in 1990, which requires health facilities receiving Medicare and Medicaid funding to give patients written information about their rights to refuse treatment under state law. Subjecting people to expensive and unwanted treatment at the
end of life makes no economic sense, and undermines patient sovereignty. 60 Pressure to disclose both prognosis and the negative side-effects of treatment for termi61
nal conditions should increase for these reasons alone.
Organ transplantation policy illustrates the potential for informed consent doctrine to enhance patient autonomy and save money where extreme and expensive
medical interventions are involved. 62 The Massachusetts Organ Transplantation
Task Force recognized this explicitlyin its 1984 Report. It noted that only three ways
to reduce deaths among patients on organ transplantation waiting lists exist, at least
so long as organ shortage remains a problem. These are (1) to increase resources
devoted to organ procurement; (2) to make medical criteria more strict; and (3) to
persuade individuals not to join waiting lists at all. 63 In the Task Force's words:
Of these three options, only number 3 has the promise of both conserving
resources and promoting individual autonomy. While we assume that most
persons medically eligible for a transplant would want one, we also assume
.. . some would not-at least if they understood all that was involved,
including the need for a lifetime commitment to daily immunosuppression
medications and periodic medical monitoring for rejection symptoms. Accordingly, it makes policy sense to publicize the risks and side-effects of
transplantation, and to require careful explanations of the procedure to be
given to prospective patients before they undergo medical screening.64
This strategy of providing accurate information in the hope of dissuading people
from seeking medical intervention also underlies legislative "informed consent" requirements for disclosure prior to abortion.65 These statutes require physicians to
discuss fetal development and related issues before obtaining consent for pregnancy termination.66 Mandatory disclosure regarding the effects of abortion on
67
fetuses is frankly designed to decrease demand for it.
of Care at the End of Life, 152 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 478 (1992); Ezekiel J. Emanuel &
Linda L. Emanuel, The Economics of Dying-The Illusion of Cost Savings at the End of
Life, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 540 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (f)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
o George J. Annas, The Health Care Proxy and the Living Will, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1210 (1991).
61 Id.
62 Cf REN9E C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS 208 (1992).

One of the most urgent value questions is whether, as poverty, homelessness,
and lack of access to health care increase in our affluent country, it is justifiable
for American society to be devoting so much of its intellectual energy and
human and financial resources to the replacement of human organs.
Id.

63

DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS

TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (Oct. 1984) (George J. Annas, Chairman, Oct. 1984).

61Id. at 83.
6" See generally Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient
Discourse and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201 (1994).
6See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (plurality opinion).
67 See Pub. Act 81-1078, § 3.5(2), 1979 Ill. Laws 4108, 4115 (repealed 1984) which
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In the U.S., informed consent is well entrenched in theory, but in practice patient autonomy continues to be elusive for many reasons.6" First, patients (particularly seriously ill ones) remain abjectly dependent on their physicians, who still
make most choices for them because of the information inequality between doctor
and patient. 69 Arnold Relman estimates that in the U.S. "probably more than 70
percent of all expenditures for personal health care are the result of decisions of
physicians. '7 Moreover, the way physicians impart information influences patient
choice. For example, patients tend to go along with therapy their physicians recommend when probable outcomes are discussed in terms of survival percentages, but
71
reject it when those very same outcomes are presented in terms of death statistics.
Secondly, although the United States has a capitalistic, market-driven economy
and views medicine as a private good, public expenditures on health care account
for more than forty percent of the approximately one trillion dollars that Americans
will spend on health care in 1995.72 The public sector will be the major payer within
a few years, even in the absence of major structural change. Finally, financial incentives in our system may simply overwhelm the legal pressure to inform patients
adequately. In commenting on his study suggesting that fully half of the coronary
angiograms now done in the U.S. are unnecessary, 73 Thomas B. Graboys recently
explained the difficulties cardiologists have in exploring diagnostic and treatment
options with their patients. He concluded, "It is [just] easier to say we will do the
angiogram and other invasive studies, and we will get paid five times as much." 74
B.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the U.K., medical care has long been viewed as a publicly provided good, and
choices are constrained by, among other things, the total budget government commits to medical services. 75 Informed consent doctrine therefore downplays patient
choice in comparison with the U.S. In Britain's leading informed consent case, 76 Amy
required doctors performing abortions to hand patients the following written statement:
"The State of Illinois wants you to know that in its view the child you are carrying is a
living human being whose life should be preserved. Illinois strongly encourages you not to
have an abortion but to go through to childbirth."
61JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
69 Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM.
EcON. REV. 941 (1963). See also Stanley J. Reiser, Consumer Competence and the Reform
of American Health Care, 267 JAMA 1511 (1992) (physicians and managers make most

health care decisions; consumer competence must be developed to bring about a consumerdetermined health care system).
70Arnold Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED. 963,
966 (1980).
71McNeil et al., supra note 11, at 1261.
72Michael Meier, These Economic Experts Advocate Higher Taxes, STAR TRIBUNE, Jan. 7
1995, at 1.
7' Thomas Graboys et al., Results of a Second Opinion Trial Among Patients Recommended for Coronary Angiography, 268 JAMA 2537, 2537 (1992).
7' Lawrence K. Altman, Study Sees Excess in X-Rays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at 16.
See generally Arnold S. Relman, Self-Referral-What's at Stake?, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1522 (1992).
75See generally RUDOLPH KLEIN, THE POLITICS OF THE NHS (2d ed. 1989). For a summary
of informed consent rules in European countries, see KENK LEENEN ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF
PATIENTS IN EUROPE (1993).

76 Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hosp. Governors, I All E.R. 643, 646 (1985).
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Doris Sidaway underwent a laminectomy (her second) which had an inherent risk of
one to two percent of paralysis. The surgery left her paralyzed on her right side. The
trial court ruled that her physician was under no legal obligation to disclose those
inherent surgical risks; the appeals panel affirmed, as did the House of Lords.
The primary question before the five Law Lords hearing the case was the source
of the physician's duty to disclose information. As in the U.S., English malpractice
law is based on the proposition that a physician "is not guilty of negligence if he has
acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of
medical men skilled in that particular art."" This is known as the Bolam test. While
many U.S. courts have abandoned this physician-oriented rule for informed consent
cases, the House of Lords did not. Four of five Law Lords accepted a physiciancentered standard of disclosure, although with differing emphases.
Lord Diplock's speech held that the Bolam test determined the physician's duty
to disclose, noting that its merit consisted in permitting physicians to base practice
on that "accepted as proper by a body of responsible and skilled medical opinion."78
Lord Templeman believed that physicians fulfill their duty of disclosure when they
provide patients with sufficient information to make a "balanced judgment."79 In his
view, the decision of what precise information to impart is for the doctor, so long as
the goal is honoring "the patient's right to information which will enable the patient
to make a balanced judgment." 0
Lord Bridge, joined by Lord Keith, generally agreed that Bolam governed disclosure, but would reserve judicial authority to overrule medical custom in certain instances:
I am of the opinion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to
the conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so obviously necessary to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no reasonably
prudent medical man would fail to make it."'
Lord Scarman alone would have altered the Bolam rule in informed consent
cases in favor of a patient-centered standard of disclosure, since he considered selfdetermination a basic human right. 2
"
'8
'9

Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., I W.L.R. 582, 582 (1957).
Sidaway, 1 All ER at 657.
Id. at 666.

soId.
" Id. at 663.

As an example, Lord Bridge cited the Canadian case of Reibl v. Hughes,
114 D.L.R. 1 (1980), which involved a ten percent risk of stroke from an operation. He
characterized this as "[a] substantial risk of grave consequences," which "[i]n the absence
of some cogent clinical reason why the patient should not be informed" would require
disclosure. In addition, Lord Bridge noted that "when questioned specifically by a patient
of apparently sound mind about risks involved in a particular proposed treatment, the
doctor's duty must . . . be to answer both truthfully and as fully as the questioner requires."
Id. at 661.
82Id. at 649. In Lord Scarman's view, the doctor's duty to disclose material risks
"[a]rises from his patient's rights." The duty in any case should depend upon "[t]he degree
of probability of the risk materializing and the seriousness of possible injury if it does." On
the other hand, Lord Scarman held that the one percent risk of paralysis involved in Amy
Sidaway's case was "slight." It was sufficiently remote to require the plaintiff "(t]o establish that the risk was so great that thedoctor should have appreciated that it would be
considered a significant fact by a prudent patient .... ." Since Mrs. Sidaway had not
demonstrated this, Lord Scarman voted with the other four Law Lords to dismiss the
appeal. Id. at 654-55.
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What Sidaway actually stands for is a matter of some dispute. David Meyers
has argued that Lord Bridge's speech giving judges the right to second-guess the
sufficiency of the information doctors disclose, "may well lead to a modified version
of the 'informed consent' doctrine the Lords apparently were so anxious, for policy
reasons, to avoid.18 3 He does, however, offer the trite caution that "only time will
tell." 4 So far, time has not been particularly kind to an expansive informed consent
doctrine in England. As Meyers and others have noted, a post-Sidaway court of
appeals decision, Gold v. Haringey Area Health Authority, wrongly concluded that
Sidaway stood for the proposition that the Bolam test was decisive on informed
consent.85 Other commentators have, properly we think, suggested that Gold misinterpreted Sidaway:
[Under Sidaway] the Judge was "free" to form his own view if he regarded
the information which was lacking as "obviously necessary for an informed
choice" or a "balanced judgment." The problem with the Court of Appeals
approach in Gold was that their reading of Sidaway failed to look beyond
the strict limits of Lord Diplock's speech. Had they done so, this backward
step, giving conclusive force to medical evidence, could have been
avoided. 6
Consumer advocates in Britain have not been silent in the wake of Sidaway, or
persuaded that physicians alone should set disclosure rules.87 Sarah Boston and Jill
Louw are advocates for full disclosure when breast cancer has been diagnosed.
They disapprove of surgeon Michael Baum's statement in Breast Cancer: The
Facts: "Women should trust the medical profession that. they are working for the
benefit of womankind; once this trust is lost there is no hope at all."8 8 Boston and
Louw counter that "trust is a two-way relationship based on mutual respect," and go
on to say that "[bletter-informed patients can no longer be treated in the paternalis"3 DAVID

W. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 131 (2d ed. 1990).
9 Id.
85[1988] Q.B. 481, 3 W.L.R. 649 (1987) (failed sterilization procedure where alternative forms of contraception were not disclosed). See also Andrew Grubb, Contraceptive
Advice and Doctors-A Law Unto Themselves?, 47 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 12 (1988).
16 Dieter Giesen & John Hayes, The Patient's Right to Know-A Comparative View, 21
ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 101, 106 (1992).
"TCf JULIA NEUBERGER, ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEES IN

THE UNITED KINGDOM (1992).
More recently, Professor
SSARAH BOSTON & JILL Louw, DISORDERLY BREASTS 31 (1987).
Baum has suggested a new way to conduct randomized clinical trials (RCTs) of treatment for
"ladylike cancers." In his words, "Since women, unlike men, enjoy a natural generosity of
spirit, it should not be too difficult to establish an organization of women, committed to
fight cancer on all fronts ....
If we were to establish a Europe-wide organization with a
membership of a million women over the age of 35, 1 in 1,000 of these will get breast
cancer each year, about 1 in 2,000 will get ovarian cancer, and one in 4,000 cervical
cancer." In Professor Baum's scheme, all one million women will have been kept informed
of ongoing cancer research, "and thus they will not only expect to be offered entry into a
controlled trial, but perhaps even demand it." Most important is Baum's continuing view
that informed consent is a "charade," and that his plan (which rests on the unlikely proposition that both arms of all RCTs of female cancer are always better than currently accepted
treatment) will advance science and let women fulfill their moral. (if uninformed, or misinformed) obligation to take part in his research. Michael Baum, New Approach for Recruitment into Randomised Controlled Trials, 341 LANCET 812, 813 (1993).
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tic and autocratic manner of the past." 9 As we will see evidenced more starkly in
Japan, cancer is often a loaded term in British medical practice,9" and Boston and
Louw observe:
Our society regards the word cancer as a taboo word and its usage is still
evaded, particularly by doctors in talking to their patients ....It is often the
patient herself who wants and needs the word spelled out clearly to grasp
the reality.91
Consumer complaints about continuing medical paternalism have had some effect. For example, the NHS took Lord Bridge's Sidaway statement seriously and
issued Patient Consent to Examination or Treatment, and a Guide to Consent for
Examination or Treatment, to all NHS doctors in September of 1990.92 NHS intended these documents to govern NHS practice, and included the statement, "where
treatment carries substantial risks the patient must be advised of this by the doctor
so that consent may be well-informed." Christopher Heneghan, a surgeon at Ealing
Hospital, subsequently responded in The Lancet with a textbook example of persisting medical paternalism. He argued that the Department's advice is "clearly wrong,"
and puts patients "at risk by giving them so much information that they refuse
necessary treatment. 93 It hardly needs pointing out that what a doctor views as
necessary treatment for a particular patient may not be what that patient considers
necessary in the context of his or her particular life circumstances. A recent study
suggests that British doctors and not their patients are the ones who really fear that
imparting information unnecessarily raises patient anxiety.94

C.

JAPAN

As an island nation with a homogeneous population enjoying universal access
to reasonably priced medical care, Japan resembles the United Kingdom. But while
Japan has borrowed many aspects of Western culture during this century, it has
retained its unique cultural identity. For example, its universal health insurance is
patterned on the German model organized around employment, 95 but other aspects
of the German system have been rejected.96 Although it is impossible to encapsulate a culture in one person's works, Japan's great writer, Yukio Mishima, probably
spoke for the Japanese people and their culture as articulately as anyone can. In
Temple of Dawn, the lawyer Honda contemplates death at the same time he contemplates taking a mistress:
If Honda had been so inclined, he could have selected the most beautiful of
the young geishas and become her patron. It could be a pleasure to buy her
11Id. Cf. Thurstan Brewin, Truth, Trust and Paternalism,2 LANCET 490 (1985).
90Cf Clive Seale, Communication and Awareness About Death: A Study of a Random
Sample of Dying People, 32 Soc. ScI. MED. 943 (1991).
9'BOSTOW & Louw, supra note 88, at 32.
92 National Health Service management documents (1990) (issued by the Department
of Health).
" Christopher Heneghan, Medicine and the Law: Consent to Medical Treatment, 337
LANCET 421 (1991) (emphasis added).
D.D. Kerrigan etal., Who's Afraid of Informed Consent?, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 298 (1993).
" See sources cited supra note 14.
6 See Naoki lkegami, The Economics of Health Care in Japan, 258 Sci. 614 (1992)
(describing the Japanese health care system). See also sources cited supra note 14.
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anything she requested and enjoy her coquetry, tenuous as a spring cloud
...those tiny feet so neatly clad in white custom-made tabi. She would be
a perfectly dressed doll in her kimono. All this could belong to him. But he
could at once foresee the conclusion. Boiling water of passion would
overflow and the dancing ashes of death would fly up to blind him.97
The Japanese people may seem to deny death in daily life as much as Americans
do, but, as this passage reflects, their literature express its inevitability without
romance.
Japan has yet to accept the doctrine of informed consent. "Nonetheless ever
since Professor Koichi Bai introduced the West German legal concept of informed
consent into Japanese academic legal theory in 1970, the number of medical malpractice suits alleging the physician's breach of duty to obtain informed consent has
increased steadily.""8 However, "the right of the patient to take part in the decisionmaking process to a large extent remains ignored." 99
Japan's leading informed consent decision, Makino v. The Red Cross Hospital,
involves the information disclosed to a cancer patient. °0 In January of 1983, Makino
went to a major hospital in Nagoya complaining of stomach pain. Her doctors told
her that they suspected a gall bladder condition and asked her to return in a week for
more tests. At that time they had made a preliminary diagnosis of cholecystic cancer, a diagnosis which they reaffirmed on three additional visits within the month.
However, they never communicated their suspicions to the patient. Her physicians
wanted a biopsy to make a definitive diagnosis, but they did not tell her the real
reason for wanting her to return for surgery. Instead they simply told her she had "a
rather bad gall bladder."
Makino had planned a trip to Singapore in March, and made an appointment to
return to the hospital in April. She later canceled the appointment, and never returned because she felt quite well. In June, however, she collapsed and was treated
for cancer at another hospital. She died in December. The lawsuit filed by her
husband and children alleged that the hospital should have informed her (or her
husband) of the preliminary cancer diagnosis in January or February, and that their
failure to do so induced the patient to make a mistaken and fatal judgment to postpone treatment.
The district court ruled that physicians have a duty tormake diagnoses and to
provide adequate treatment. Physicians must also inform patients or their families
about the nature of the illness, the expected course of therapy, and its anticipated
effects, "'since the patient has a right to self-determination on his own therapy.'
How such information should be given is in the discretion of the doctor to the extent
that the patient's right of self-determination is not infringed."''
Except for the
9 YuKIo MISHIMA, THE TEMPLE OF DAWN 195 (1973) (emphasis added).

9 Hiroyuki Hattori et al., The Patient's Right to Information in Japan-Legal Rules
and Doctor's Opinions, 32 SCI. MED. 1007, 1009 (1991) [hereinafter Patient's Right in Japan].
9Id. at 1007.
'o Our description of this case is taken entirely from Norio Higuchi, The Patient's
Right to Know of a Cancer Diagnosis: A Comparison of Japanese Paternalism and Ameri-

can Self-Determination, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 455, 458-61 (1992) (citing Judgment of May
29, 1989 (Makino v. The Red Cross Hospital), Chisai [Nagoya District Court], 1325 Hanji
103 (Japan)). See also Fred Hiatt, Japan Court Ruling Backs Doctors; Judge Says That
Patients May Be Kept Ignorant of Their Illnesses, WASH. POST, May 30, 1989, at A9.
101Higuchi, supra note 100, at 460 (quoting Makino).
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family's involvement, to this point the opinion is fairly consistent with those of most
U.S. courts. However, the right enunciated was quickly gutted. The decision articulated a wide-open therapeutic privilege which permits doctors to decide, in their
discretion, when, to whom, and in how much detail information shall be conveyed.
The court concluded in Makino that since the physicians had never confirmed
their diagnosis of cholecystic cancer by biopsy, they had no duty to disclose their
suspicions. Moreover, even if such a final diagnosis had been made, "it would be
unreasonable" to require physicians to disclose the diagnosis of a virtually incurable disease to a patient." 2 Finally, such a diagnosis is most properly disclosed to
the family, not the patient. The Makino court found that the defendant-physicians'
plan to disclose only upon the subsequent hospital admission, which the patient
canceled, was reasonable. Further, the court held that the doctors had no duty to do
anything more than they had done."3
Japanese commentator Norio Higuchi found this case very helpful, noting that:
[T]he decision takes a step forward at the least, even though, I admit, it is
only a small step, from the previous rulings by courts. While the prior
decisions have held it depends upon the doctor's discretion whether he
should inform or not, the court says that the discretion in the doctor is
limited to the questions as to whom, when and in how much detail he should
04
inform. 1
Professor Higuchi also argues that to conclude that the court found a duty to
disclose and a right to self-determination only after a definitive diagnosis has been
made oversimplifies the opinion. Instead Higuchi believes that the physician had a
duty to inform under the facts of this case, but properly exercised his discretion
about how to inform the patient within the confines of that duty. 05
A Westerner is struck not so much with the amount of discretion ceded to
physicians (essentially the state of U.S. law prior to the 1970s, and of British law
today), but by the accepted concept that informing the patient's family is equivalent
to informing the patient herself. The Japanese concept of dependency may best explain
the failure of informed consent to be adopted.l"6 Professor Rihito Kimura explains:
Autonomy ... is out of keeping with the Japanese cultural tradition. Our
culture, nurtured in Buddhist and Confucian teaching, has developed the
idea of suppressing the egoistic self. To be autonomous and independent
is sometimes regarded as egocentric. Thus, in Japan each human being is
dependent on others in the family, and the social, economic and political
communities.1 07
102Id.

103Id. at 461.

Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 463. Other commentators have not been so kind. See, e.g., Noritoshi Tanida,
Patients' Rights in Japan, 337 LANCET 242, 243 (1991).
"°6See, e.g,. RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD (1946); TAKEO Doi, THE
ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1971).
Takeo Doi is unimpressed by individualism in America,
'o
'o

however. As he observes about American conformity, "even in a society in which individuals stand out, the appearance of real individuals is strangely absent." TAKEO Doi, THE
57 (1985).
"07Rhito Kimura, In Japan, Parents Participate but Doctors Decide,
Aug. 1986, at 22, 23.
ANATOMY OF SELF

HASTINGS CTR. REP.,
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Stephan Salzberg argues in his study of Japan's mental health laws that in the
Japanese world view, "autonomy, to a lesser or greater extent, yields to the nurturance
and security provided by one's group, and especially one's family."'' 8 He notes that
obtaining consent from family members instead of from the patient "is a common
practice.., especially when patients themselves are kept in the dark regarding their
own cancerous or other life-threatening conditions."109 Other Japanese observers
concur:
Even in cases where the patient is competent to give his or her individual
consent, substitute consent by the family or close relatives is a common
practice in order to avoid disturbing the patient emotionally ... the Japanese favor being indirect and do not like complete information about a
serious condition to be stated explicitly."'
Japan's failure to embrace Western notions of informed consent reflects the
alternatives available in its health care system, which downplays the individual and
hence de-emphasizes high-cost, low-yield technology. While the health sector emphasizes universal access and cost control, the general quality of care in Japan is
lower than Western standards."' Medical training in Japan is relatively weak and
classroom-based only, and little medical specialty certification exists. Physicians on
average spend less than five minutes with each patient per visit, and all physicians
are paid on the same tightly regulated fee-for-service schedule, regardless of individual experience or training. Doctors increase their incomes by seeing patients
repeatedly, and by directly selling to them the average of five drugs that are prescribed at each clinical encounter. Moreover, drug retailing accounts for as much as
forty percent of the average physician's income."' Doctors also tend to hospitalize
most of their patients in private solo-practice office-based clinics which they own, 113
and where the average patient stay is fifty-two days.1'4 Physicians resist sending
patients to the relatively few Japanese hospitals offering sophisticated care, because patients tend not to return thereafter for the lower-technology services they
offer.
These entrepreneurial aspects of medical practice explain why the citizens of
Japan spend a larger percentage of their health care expenditures (thirty percent) on
drugs than do the citizens of any other country."' The comparable U.S. figure, for
1o8Stephan M. Salzberg, Japan's New Mental Health Law:
Places?, 14

INT'L J.L.

& PSYCHIATRY 137, 153 (1991)

More Light Shed on Dark

(footnote omitted).

109Id.
110Tanida, supra note 105, at 1014.

,' See generally Naoki Ikegami, Japanese Health Care: Low Cost Through Regulated
Fees, 10 HEALTH AFF. 87 (1991).
2

" M. POWELL & M. ANESAKI, HEALTH CARE IN JAPAN (1990). See also Theodore R. Marmor,
Japan: A Sobering Lesson, 14 HEALTH MGMT. Q. 10, 12 (1992).
113Japan had about 200,000 physicians in 1988; doctors are permitted to run their own
nineteen-bed or smaller clinics-anything larger is classified as a hospital. About 30 percent of all Japanese physicians, called Kaigyo-i, or clinic doctors, own their own clinics.
Their monthly income is approximately four times higher than that of hospital-based
doctors. Aki Yoshikawa et al., How Does Japan Do It? Doctors and Hospitals in a
Universal Health Care System, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11l, 124 (1991). See also Martatoshi
Abe, Japan's Clinic Physicians and Their Behavior, 20 Soc. ScI. MED. 335 (1985).
" Ikegami, supra note 111, at 89-90.
115 Id.; Marmor, supra note 112, at 10 (quoting a 1980 figure of 38 percent).

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

376

VOL. XX NO. 4 1994

example, is approximately five percent.'1 6 Not only do Japanese doctors prescribe
(and sell) many drugs, butmany of these drugs appear useless from a scientific
perspective. For example Krestin, an anti-cancer drug with no proven efficacy anywhere else in the world, is one of the most popular drugs in Japan.! 7 Physicians
apparently feel less guilty about failing to inform patients that they have cancer
when they can prescribe the ineffective Krestin, because it produces no debilitating
side-effects.
In short, the Japanese health care system "works" at a comparatively low level
of expenditure in large part because patients are rarely informed about diagnoses or
about the relatively few available alternative forms of treatment. Major changes in
the Japanese health care system will require doctors to give patients more information. Pressure is mounting to develop more specialty referral hospitals, but patients
must be persuaded to, utilize them. As the Makino case illustrates, more candid
disclosures about diagnosis' and treatment may be required in order to secure patient compliance with the therapy physicians do recommend. I"
Japan also remains the only industrial society to reject brain death criteria, thus
rendering heart transplantation currently impossible in Japanese hospitals. Some
observers contend thatdifficult interpersonal relationships among families and physicians at the time of death generate this resistance." 9 Others believe it results from
general religious or societal views about the innate meaning of death. 20 However,
Japanese physicians must give families far more detailed explanations and much
fuller disclosure-at a time when such discussions are not currently held-in order
for Japan to implement brain death criteria. Perhaps as a portent of change, the
Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare has recently argued for modifications in
traditional physician practices of nondisclosure.' 2 ' The Ministry has concluded
that even in the case of terminally ill cancer patients, the diagnosis should be revealed.'22

16

Gale Eisenstadt, The Doctor's Margin, FORBES, Nov. 23, 1992, at 44. The Japanese

are the largest per capita consumers of drugs in the world, at $1,668 per capita in 1989, as
compared with $1,098 in the United States. Mitsuru Mabuchi, Doctor Criticizes Overdose
of Ineffective Drugs in Japan, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. 1, 1990. See also Blaming
Someone Else: Japan Needs Better Arrangements for Conducting Clinical Trials of New
Therapeutic Drugs, 371 NATURE 89 (1994).
117
A Shot in the Arm, Bus. TOKYO, April 1992, at 40. Japanese doctors like to prescribe
Krestin to "treat" a variety of cancer-related symptoms in order to avoid telling terminal
patients the difficult truth. Though harmless, the drug has never been proven effective,
and the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare recently warned doctors to reduce the
number of prescriptions they write. See also Nicholas Kristof, When Doctor Won't Tell
Cancer Patient The Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at 2.
"' See Ikegami, supra note 111.
119 See Kate Brown, Death and Access: Ethics in Cross-CulturalHealth Care, in CHOICES
AND CONFLICT: EXPLORATIONS IN HEALTH CARE ETHICS 85, 87 (E. Friedman ed. 1992); see also
Kazumasa Hoshino, Legal Status of Brain Death in Japan: Why Many Japanese Do Not
Accept "Brain Death" as a Definition of Death, 7 BIOETHICS 234 (1993). Terminating
treatment in persistent vegetative states has only recently even been discussed. See Japanese Panel Backs 'Death With Dignity', AM. MED. NEWS, July 11, 1994, at 23.
120Brown, supra note 119, at 85; Hoshino, supra note 119, at 234; Japanese Panel
Backs 'Death With Dignity', supra note 119, at 23.
2I N. lanida, Patients' Rights in Japan (letter), 337 LANCET 242 (1991); see MELVIN
KONNER, MEDICINE AT THE CROSSROADS 3-27 (1993).
"2 lanida, supra note 121, at 242; see KONNER, supra note 121, at 3-27.

THE EMPIRE OF DEATH
CULTURE, CHOICE, AND HEALTH RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Patient knowledge advances personal autonomy; it elevates consent to medical
treatment from a flak jacket merely protecting doctors from battery liability to an
enhancement of patient sovereignty.123 But as the foregoing discussion demonstrates, not all cultures place the same value on truth-telling and on an individual's
124
ability to make fully informed choices, nor do they share the same fear of death.
Informed consent legal doctrine reflects and shapes societal value choices, and thus
it varies from country to country, and from time to time within countries.
Total expenditures on health care vary considerably across national borders as
well.' 25 It is not a coincidence that the U.S., which treats health care as a market
good, spends far more money on the health sector than does any other country in
the world. 26 Moreover, it does so while approximately fourteen percent of its population remains uninsured. Three years ago, the U.S. spent 131 percent more per
capita on health care than did Japan, and almost 200 percent more than did the
U.K.'27 For all that expenditure, however, the U.S. trails behind the U.K., Japan, and
many other industrialized nations in such basic health-outcome measurements as
infant mortality, perinatal mortality, and male life expectancy.'
The U.S. accords the highest status in the world to informed consent in part
because we engage in the fiction that patients actually exercise economic choice
when they purchase medical services. However, individuals usually are better situated to exercise economic choice when they buy health insurance, or at least when
choosing among competing insurance plans that their employers subsidize. 29 The
luxury of choice is conspicuously curtailed for the approximately forty million of
Americans who are still uninsured.
Health care markets have traditionally deviated significantly from the competitive ideal, propelled by a variety of forces.130 Chief among these forces are information problems and purchasing subsidies. Medical information is often difficult for
I.

123 cf., L.J. Donaldson's description of consent in Re J, UK Court of Appeal (July 10,
1992), focusing on protection for the physician rather than for the patient.
2 See AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35 at 16-17.
2'See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOA/HRD-92-9, HEALTH CARE SPENDING CON-

TROL: THE EXPERIENCE OF FRANCE, GERMANY AND JAPAN (1991) [hereinafter HEALTH CARE SPENDING
CONTROLI; George J. Schieber & Jean-Pierre Poullier, International Health Spending and
Utilization Trends, 7 HEALTH AFF. 105 (1988).
26
' See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1992, tbl. no.

1368, Health Expenditures-Selected Countries: 1980-1990 829 (1992). This is true whether
one measures such expenditures in absolute terms, as a percentage of national GNP, or as a
per capita expenditure. Id. Nor is it merely a fluke that the world's highest medical
malpractice litigation rates, and its highest percentage of specialist physicians as compared
with primary care doctors (family practitioners, internists and pediatricians), are found in
the U.S. as well. Steven A. Schroeder, Physician Supply and the U.S. Medical Marketplace,
11 HEALTH AFp. 235 (1992). Cf. Basil S. Markesinis, Litigation Mania in England, Germany
and the USA: Are We So Very Different?, 49 CAMB. L.J. 233 (1990).
27 Leslie M. Greenwald, Meaning in Numbers, HEALTH MGMT. Q. 6, 7, tbl. I (Third
Quarter 1992).
2I Id. at 7, 9, tbl. 6.
Can Consumers Contract Today to
129 Cf. Clark Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial:
Accept Health Care Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755 (1992).
"' See generally Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 227, 233 (1988); Competition in the Health Sector,
1977 F. T. C. CONF. PROC.
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patients to assimilate,' 3' sometimes emotionally painful, 32 and in rare cases even
potentially harmful 3 3 for them to absorb. Moreover, the financial ramifications of
patients' treatment choices are usually obscured by health insurance and tax subsidies for medical and insurance purchases, if not by forthright governmental provision of care. 3 4 Defensive medicine' 35 and the technological imperative 3 6 further
skew health markets toward unnecessary services, particularly in the United States.
Regulatory supply restrictions such as certificate of need programs make unsuc37
cessful attempts to redress this imbalance.
Different cultures take differing official approaches to health resource allocation. Some countries rely primarily on governmental price and spending controls
that affect everything from technology acquisition to hospital and physician reimbursement rates. For example, in the circumstances of tightly managed supply that
exist in the U.K., primary care physicians assume powerful gatekeeping functions.
These general practitioners must filter patient demand for medical services from
clinical "need" for limited specialist and high technology care. This filter entails
correspondingly narrower scope for individual choice. 38 When medical choice is
constrained by supply limitations, telling patients about potentially beneficial but
economically unattainable therapy can be criticized as inhumane. 3 9 However, such
131 Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 428 (1990).
132Margaret A. Drickamer & Mark S. Lachs, Should Patients with Alzheimer's Disease
be Told Their Diagnosis?, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 947 (1992). As diagnostic markers and
therapy improve, doctors will be compelled to disclose painful information in order to
secure informed consent for initiating therapy.
"I See Elizabeth G. Patterson, The Therapeutic Justification for Withholding Medical
Information: What You Don't Know Can't Hurt You, or Can It?, 64 NEB. L. REV. 721 (1985);
Margaret A. Somerville, Therapeutic Privilege: Variation on the Theme of Informed Consent, 12 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 4 (1984).
114The government itself furnishes health care under Great Britain's National Health
Service. In the U.S., where approximately 41 percent of medical services are governmentfunded, government provides some services directly through institutions such as Veterans
Administration, city, state and county hospitals, etc.
"' See Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving
Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1394-95 (1989); E. Haavi Morreim,
Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1731 (1987).
But see GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 4 (1993) [hereinafter STANDARD OF CARE]. ("[A]ny medical treatment done primarily to protect the physician from potential lawsuits [rather than to benefit the patient], although sometimes legal,
is by definition unethical.").
136 AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 66.
137 See generally Frank A. Sloan et al., COST, QUALITY AND ACCESS IN HEALTH CARE:
NEW

ROLES FOR HEALTH PLANNING IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT (1988).

Cf. David A. Grimes, Technology Follies: The Uncritical Acceptance of Medical Innovation, 269 JAMA 3030 (1993).
There is little doubt, however, that supply in large measure determines demand in medical
care. This helps explain the paradox that the more organs become available for kidney,
liver, and heart transplants in the United States, the longer the waiting lines for these
transplants have grown. George J. Annas, The Paradoxes of Organ Transplantation,78 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 621 (1988).
"I See Robert G. Lee & Frances H. Miller, The Doctor's Changing Role in Allocating U.S.
and British Medical Services, 18 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 69 (1990); Robert Schwartz & Andrew Grubb, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Aug. 1985, at 19.
1a9
"The key to turning down the patient 'is not to get eyeball to eyeball with him
because if you do there is no way you can actually say no."' AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note
35, at 107 (commenting on how British physicians cope with scarce medical resources),
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disclosure can also mobilize public opinion to challenge resource allocation inconsistent with societal values. 14
The General Medical Council (which licenses British doctors) explicitly reinforces the gatekeeping function by warning in its principles of professional conduct: "a specialist should not usually accept a patient without reference from the
patient's general practitioner."'' Violation of this "ethical" rule could at least theoretically result in licensure sanctions. However, the British Medical Association
surely contemplates political activism on the part of the medical profession when its
own ethical principles state, "the doctor may decide to tell the patient that [specialist] treatment is not available because of lack of funds," suggesting that "patients
may complain to politicians."' 42
In countries officially dependent on gatekeeping like the U.K., informed consent doctrine not unsurprisingly favors professional rather than patient-oriented
standards of disclosure, particularly with regard to treatment alternatives. 143 Other
cultures-most prominently the U.S.-prefer to let a more entrepreneurial market set
the basic dimensions for health sector investment.'" U.S. informed consent law
generally reflects support for market allocation mechanisms, and thus tends to expand the possibilities for patient choice through more thoroughgoing informed consent requirements. 45
But how can we explain Japan, where physicians are highly entrepreneurial and
most hospitals and all clinics are privately owned, yet where the law supports keeping patients in the dark about diagnoses of serious illness?' 46 First, Japan does not
impose the same budgetary controls that cap total health care spending in the U.K.,
although it regulates physician fees tightly and capped the number of hospital beds
in 1985. 41 It is dangerous for outsiders to generalize about any society, but cultural
analysts from both Japan and America agree that in Japan individuality is deemed
subservient to group needs and ideals. As a consequence, the proper role of the
patient is to follow the instructions of the physician, who presumably has a superior
110Miller, supra note 12, at 56-57.
"'GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL (UK), PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE: FITNESS To PRAC-

22 (1991).
' BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHILOSOPHY & PRACTICE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 73 (1988).
" 3 On the U.K., see Schwartz and Grubb, supra note 138, at 19 (commenting on Sidaway
v. Royal Bethlem Hospital, [19851 2 W.L.R 483). See generally Frances H. Miller, Informed Consent for the Man on the Clapham Omnibus: A British Cure for the "American
Disease?", 9 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 169 (1987).
I" Successful health sector competition requires informed medical service purchasers;
patients-or their surrogate purchasers-must understand diagnosis probabilities, treatment alternatives, risks, and personal costs of all kinds before making choices about consuming services. Such information traditionally emanates from providers, whose position
on treatment issues may be entirely patient-centered, but could also be compromised for
reasons ranging from altruistic paternalism, to scientific elitism, to direct conflict of
economic interest.
143In the U.S., see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972). Although the states are more or less split on patient-centered
versus physician-dominated standards of disclosure, the trend is toward a patient-centered
standard. Even though tort reform legislation in some states has modified patient-centered
standards of disclosure, cultural expectations push toward disclosure of more complete
information than is required in other countries.
1,6 See James Sterngold, Japan's Health Care: Cradle, Grave and No Frills, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 1992, at Al.
"' Ikegami, supra note 111, at 614.
TICE
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14
understanding of the patient's illness and its significance. 1
Regardless of official government policy concerning health sector resource allocation, more or less flexibility concerning that policy usually exists within any
society in practice. This flexibility is strongly influenced by the general cultural
attitude toward death, and by what patients, health policy experts, and financiers
actually know or believe about the availability and efficacy of medical services. 149 In
the majority of industrialized nations, where health care is considered a public good
essentially guaranteed by government, spending caps, regulated fees, and central
planning for capital expenditures are philosophically de rigueur.10
This tradition is under severe challenge. Even the U.K., a long-standing and
successful showcase for socialized medicine, in 1991 introduced competitive forces
to boost efficiency in the National Health Service. 15' By separating the government's
provider function from its purchaser role, the NHS now forces health care institutions to compete for explicitly capped government funds. 5 2 On the other hand, the
U.S., which treats health care as a private good and espouses health sector competition as the primary allocation device, has elected a President committed on record
(at least at one time) to collectivist ideas about spending caps." Anyone with a
good imagination can visualize American and European ships of state steaming right
past one another in mid-Atlantic, each vainly searching the other's shores for solutions to the woes besetting domestic health systems.
Perfect health sector efficiency and equity are unattainable goals for any society. Neither scientific truth nor the human condition remain static, 54 and economic
resources are never infinite. Setting limits on medical expenditures seems related to
a society's view of mortality, but it begins with a recognition that limits are necessary. British Minister of Health Enoch Powell once aptly described the demand for
medical care as potentially infinite:

Tanida, supra note 105, at 1014.
14 Providers have been deliberately omitted here, although their treatment recommendations give them a particularly powerful position in decision-making at the micro level,
because they "sell" rather than buy medical services.
110See Brian Abel-Smith, Cost Containment and New Priorities in the European Community, 70 MILBANK Q. 393 (1992); HEALTH CARE SPENDING CONTROL, supra note 125. However,
European countries such as the Netherlands, which ensures residents virtually universal
access to basic health services though a mix of mandatory and voluntary health insurance,
are currently exploring reforms to increase health sector competition. CHRIS HAM ET AL.,
HEALTH CHECK: HEALTH CARE REFORMS IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (1990); J. Van Londen,
141 See

Netherlands:, Rational Choices In Health Care, 340 LANCET 228 (1992).
15 National Health Service and Community Care Act, 1990, ch. 19 (Eng.).
152 Frances H. Miller, Competition Law and Anticompetitive Physician Behavior, 55
MOD. L. REV. 453, 455-63 (1992).
Sweden is also contemplating competition initiatives to
improve state-provided medical services. Richard B. Saltman, Competition and Reform in
the Swedish Health System, 64 MILEANK Q. 597 (1990).
"I Paul Cotton, Less is More and More is Less in Health Care: Proposals Offered in '92
Campaign, 268 JAMA 1635-39 (1992). Moreover, the state of Oregon has implemented overt
rationing for its Medicaid patients, after the Clinton Administration waived Medicaid conditions of participation to enable Oregon to limit treatment for certain medical conditions.
" P. B. Beeson, Changes in Medical Therapy During the Past Half Century, in MEDICINE
59, 79-99 (1980) (value of 60 percent of remedies in first edition of Cecil's Textbook of
Medicine rated as harmful, dubious or merely symptomatic by the time the 14th edition was
published; only 3 percent offered fully effective prevention or treatment by then-current
standards).
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There is virtually no limit to the amount of medical care an individual is
capable of absorbing ... not only is the range of treatable conditions huge
and rapidly growing; there is also a vast range of quality in the treatment of
these conditions .... There is hardly a type of condition from the most
trivial to the gravest which is not susceptible of alternative treatments under conditions affording a wide range of skill, care, comfort, privacy, efficiency [etc.] ... there is a multiplier effect of successful medical treatment.
Improvement in expectation of survival results in lives that demand further
medical care. The poorer (medically speaking) the quality of the lives preserved by advancing medical science, the more intense are the demands
they continue to make. In short, the appetite for medical treatment vient en
mangeant.1'5
Any country's health policy must continuously grapple with economic scarcity
and with scientific, political, and cultural change. The successes and failures of
other systems can be illuminating, but cultural attitudes toward medical information
and other medical issues as well must be unearthed and understood if reform imported from other countries can succeed in new environments.156 Of course, societies and medical practitioners must grapple with the role of malpractice litigation in
setting standards of care.
Customary medical practice, the standard against which a doctor's conduct is
usually measured in a medical malpractice action, reflects the way resources are
spent on care for individual patients in every culture.' 57 Since patients rarely refuse
their doctors' recommendations for therapy, physician treatment preferences strongly
influence the way societies allocate total health resources. But the concept of
customary medical practice defies precise definition. What doctors actually do
develops gradually over time as physicians adapt treatment to scientific advance,
economic rewards and penalties, and more generalized legal and cultural incentives,
especially a society's attitude toward death.'58 In most countries the evolution of
medical custom over the past few decades can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 1,
revealing a generally upward trajectory in the direction of more intensive-and expensive-medical services. In the U.S., the managed care initiatives of the past
decade have somewhat tempered the ascent of that curve. However, some fear that
more universal health insurance will usher in an era of more Draconian cost containment, in which we will begin rationing necessary services instead of merely reducing
159
superfluous care.
In reality, customary medical practice does not conform to the precisely defined
concept pictured abstractly as a single line in Figure 1.160 John Wennberg and
supra note 75, at 67-68; see also, STANDARD OF CARE, supra note 135.
56 Lawrence H. Thompson, Observations on "Cost Containment and New Priorities in

1S KLEIN,

the European Community" by Brian Abel-Smith, 70 MILBANK Q. 417 (1992).
157 Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care:
A Call
for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1483, 1484 (1989).
'5 For a detailed look at U.S. financial incentives, see STEVEN R. EASTAUGH, HEALTH CARE
FINANCE: ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCEMENT (1992).
' See generally Symposium, Rationing Health Care: Social, Political and Legal
Perspectives, 18 AM. J. L. & MED. 1 (1992); Symposium, The Law and Policy of Health Care
Rationing: Models and Accountability, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1505 (1992).
60 In the U.S., the practice guidelines and total quality improvement initiatives have
sensitized many health professionals and policy makers to the broad range of physician
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others have convincingly demonstrated that physicians' treatment choices vary
widely, and are often influenced as much by individtal training as by scientific
evidence.16' The medical literature also documents persuasively that when physicians receive additional income from their diagnostic methods or their treatment
recommendations, utilization increases dramatically.'62 Similar physicians thus often do completely dissimilar things for identically situated patients for widely varying reasons.
Rather than the single line depicted in the foregoing diagram, customary practice actually constitutes a wide band of professional behavior, whose outer borders
reflect the extremes of individual physicians' practice preferences. At any given
moment, doctors employing a wide variety of treatments and skills for identical
conditions may be practicing nonnegligently in the eyes of the law. 63 Nonetheless,
they might also be providing superfluous or deficient care from the viewpoint of
scientifically demonstrable safety and efficacy.'6 The concept of customary medical care can simultaneously embrace both completely useless medical services and
downright dangerous dereliction of duty, because it is ordinarily derived from what
physicians actually do, not from what they should do. This reality is depicted in the
following refinement of the first diagram (see Figure 2).
Well-documented evidence of unwarranted treatment variations gave rise to
U.S. practice guidelines and total quality improvement movements. These U.S. variations prepare the uninitiated for the startlingly expansive spectrum of diagnostic
and therapeutic strategies conventionally utilized for identical medical conditions in
other industrialized nations. 165 These sometimes radically different approaches produce nearly identical or even better results than our own as measured by standard
morbidity and mortality indices. 166 Surgical intervention rates adjusted for population difference illustrate this point. U.S. surgeons performed more than six times as
many hysterectomies as did their Japanese counterparts in 1980, and twice as many

treatment preferences parading under the banner of customary practice. See generally
Peter G. Goldschmidt, Can Practice Guidelines Reduce Malpractice Claims?, 267 JAMA
2602 (1992); Leahy, supra note 157; Morreim, supra note 135, at 1731-36.
161John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 HEALTH AFF. 6 (1984); John E. Wennberg, Variations in Medical Care Among Small
Areas, 126 Sci. AM. 120 (1984).
161See, e.g., Thomas S. Crane, The Problem of Physician Self-Referral under the Medicare and Medicaid Antikickback Statute, 268 JAMA 85 (1992); Bruce Hillman et al.,
Physicians' Utilization and Charges for Outpatient Diagnostic Imaging in a Medicare
Population, 268 JAMA 2050 (1992); Jean Mitchell et al., Physician Ownership of Physical
Therapy Services: Effects on Charges, Utilization, Profits, and Service Characteristics,268
JAMA 2055 (1992). See generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY & MORALS (1993).
163Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the Screws,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 985, 1008-10 (1986).
'" See Gordon Guyat et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching
the Practice of Medicine, 268 JAMA 2420 (1992) (advocating a de-emphasis on "intuition,
unsystematic clinical experience, and pathologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical
decision-making").
15 See generally MEDICINE & CULTURE, supra note 15.
'6 Of the three countries compared in this article, in 1988 the U.S. spent the most per
capita and had the worst statistics with regard to infant mortality, perinatal mortality and
male life expectancy. Japan spent less per capita than any other of the three countries
except the U.K. and had the best statistics in these areas. Leslie M. Greenwald, Meaning in
Numbers, HEALTH MGMT. Q., Third Quarter, 1992, at 9, tbl. 6.

384

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

VOL. XX NO. 4 1994

ob

o
S:z

0o

CD

0

Gb

"t
b

-.

C.
9'

THE EMPIRE OF DEATH
as doctors performed in the U.K.'67 They carried out ten times as many coronary
artery bypass operations as did U.K. physicians, and sixty times as many as were
done in Japan. 6 ' On the other hand, Japanese physicians performed almost twice as
many appendectomies in that same year as did doctors in the U.S. or the U.K. 169
Although environmental and demographic factors may explain some of these
variations, cultural expectations and reimbursement patterns in each country play a
central role in the frequency of surgical procedures. 70 If we had depicted customary
medical practice in the world's industrialized nations on the foregoing diagram, the
width of the customary practice band would be so wide as to render the term "customary" meaningless.
V

CULTURE AND DEATH
How can we account for the continuing formal differences in informed consent
doctrine in the U.S., Britain, and Japan, notwithstanding burgeoning respect for
autonomy in the latter countries and a new appreciation for setting limits in the U.S.?
Perhaps even though the governing legal theories are different and reflect different
cultural expectations, physician disclosure practices are actually quite similar. Japan's
most famous case of nondisclosure involved the late Emperor Hirohito, who died in
1989 without ever having being told that he was suffering from intestinal cancer.' 7'
Although Americans tend to react smugly when told about the Hirohito case, on
further reflection one might conclude that we may treat our own "emperors" in
somewhat the same way.
In 1991 Paul Tsongas was a strong contender for the Democratic Presidential
nomination, and one of the centerpieces of his campaign concerned his successful
fight against cancer. After the election it was revealed that his illness had recurred
in 1987, and he suffered an additional recurrence in late 1992. How much Tsongas
knew about his prognosis remains unclear, as is how much his physicians told him
after his initial bone marrow transplant. Tsongas may sincerely have believed that
the operation "cured" him of cancer, and if so his physicians apparently did nothing
to dissuade him or the American public from that belief. As physician-reporter
Lawrence Altman put it, "No less than the outcome of the 1992 Presidential primaries, and thus the election itself, could have been influenced by . . . [Tsongas'
treating physicians'] withholding of critical information."'7 Even after his second
recurrence Tsongas told a press conference that he "had not discussed his prognoMcPherson, supra note 25, at 22.
Id. Japan has relatively few sophisticated tertiary care hospitals; open heart surgery
I68
is for that reason alone relatively rare. Only two percent of hospital beds are designated
for intensive care of medical and surgical patients (compared with more than six percent in
the U.S.). C.A. Sirio et al., An Initial Comparison of Intensive Care in Japan and the
United States, 20 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1207 (1992).
.69
McPherson, supra note 25. Japanese doctors are paid fee-for-service, and many are
thought to perform unnecessary routine surgery to generate higher incomes. Pathology
reports on excised appendixes reveal that approximately sixty percent were not diseased.
ROEMER, supra note 14, at 160.
o See generally McPherson, supra note 25.
7 Susan Chira, Hirohito, 124th Emperor of Japan, is Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1989, at 1.
72 Lawrence K. Altman, Tsongas's Health: Privacy and the Public's Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1993, at 26.
'6
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sis in detail with his doctors."
The cases of Hirohito and Tsongas support the view that complete physician
candor with patients is not universally observed in any culture, at least not when
dealing with cancer or other life-threatening illness. Surveys of American physicians also support the hypothesis that while physicians recognize their legal obligation to inform patients about diagnosis and the risks of recommended treatment,
they are much less forthcoming about prognosis. For example, a major 1982 survey
of Americans and their physicians performed for the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
found that eighty-five percent of Americans would want their physicians to give
them a "realistic estimate of how long" they had to live if they had "a type of cancer
that usually leads to death in less then a year."' 74 On the other hand, more than half.
of all U.S. physicians would either refuse to speculate on how long a patient "with a
fully confirmed diagnosis of lung cancer in an advanced stage" would live, or would
say that "you can't tell how long he might live, but stress that it could be for a
175
substantial period of time."'
In a more recent but smaller study, Japanese researcher Naoko Miyaji conducted
structured interviews with thirty-two east coast physicians in various specialties.
She found that while physicians routinely told patients about their diagnosis, when
dealing with prognosis "many physicians try to give patients very vague informa'
tion."176
Statistically, her results were virtually identical to those found by the
President's Commission: half of the physicians would not explicitly tell patients
they were dying. Physicians often justify their evasion by explaining that patients
usually know this anyway, but as Miyaji observes, there may be "a significant gap
between the patient's perception and the physician s.' 1 77 Miyaji notes that information-giving can be used by physicians to control the situation as much as information-withholding. Regarding prognosis information she concludes:
physicians' focusing on treatment options and leaving out prognosis (the
worse part of the information) is the key to understanding the coexistence
of information control with patient-centered ethical norms in the context of
7
current American medicine. 1
These studies and the facts in Arato179 support the proposition that U.S. doctors behave similarly to those Japanese physicians who will not tell patients they
have cancer because they believe patients see cancer as a death sentence and will
be unnecessarily depressed. They also behave as do British doctors, who are able
to rationalize economic limits on their ability to offer cancer patients every kind of
sophisticated therapy so long as they can avoid getting "eyeball to eyeball," where
17 Lawrence K. Altman, Tsongas Says He Mishandled Issue of His Cancer, N.Y.
Dec. 1, 1991, at Al.

TIMES,

17 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND

Two: APPENDICES, EMPIRICAL STUDIES
OF INFORMED CONSENT 221-24, 245 (1982).
Id. at 246.
171 Naoko T. Miyaji, The Power of Compassion: Truth-Telling Among American Doctors in the Care of Dying Patients, 36 Soc. ScI. MED. 249, 257 (1993).
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, VOL.

177Id.

171 Id. at 262.
1'9
See supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
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frank conversation might have to ensue.8 0 Not surprisingly, the hospice movement,
which rejects heroic medical treatment and is openly designed to ease the natural
transition to death, first flowered in England.181
We hypothesize that a culture's general attitude toward death dictates what
prognosis information physicians will provide to patients, as well as how both physicians and patients view reasonable medical interventions throughout their adult
lives. Where cultures are more homogeneous than the U.S., such as those of Japan
and England, we would expect more cultural agreement on treatment recommendations. Prognosis disclosure may therefore be less important. Moreover, the closer
the physician and patient are in terms of economic class and attitudes toward death,
the less likely explicit disclosure will be seen as necessary or appropriate. In the
U.S., because cultural diversity is more pronounced and a wider gulf between the
economic and spiritual belief systems of physicians and their patients may exist, the
law may be more needed to enforce disclosures because patients cannot "trust"
their doctors to act based on shared values. Even legal sanctions, however, will
often be insufficient to make candid disclosure a reality.
Ultimately a culture's view of death, and the role of medicine in preventing or
postponing it, is at work when unpleasant or uncertain medical facts are not communicated to patients. In the U.S., for example, we usually seem to accept that prolonging life (at virtually any price) is a reasonable goal for medicine. Thus, procedures
are introduced and utilized that offer hope of extending life without regard to cost, or
even to the quality of the life prolonged. As two physician commentators describe
it, "The medical profession in the United States has reflected our society's unwillingness to accept death as part of life and to face it with some humility.., how sterile
and technological our profession has become."' 2
Our seemingly automatic use of technology to protract the dying process has
spawned development of a clearly articulated legal right to refuse treatment. More
than fifty state appeals court decisions and an opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court
have affirmed this patient prerogative.' 83 In a country where still no right of access
to basic health services exists, and where the major problem for approximately forty
million Americans is obtaining any medical care outside hospital emergency departments, the development of such a right seems remarkable. The rallying cry of U.S.
medical ethics has been focused more on the "right to die" than on the right to
health care.' We continue to debate physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia far
more passionately than we debate the appropriate minimum benefit package. 85 AmeriIo AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 107.
8' See Cicely Saunders, Dying They Live: St. Christopher's

Hospice, in NEW

MEANINGS

OF

153-79 (H. Feifel ed., 1977). Recently, the House of Lords specifically articulated
that not only may competent patients decline medical treatment, but artificial feeding may
also be withheld from patients in a persistent vegetative state. Airedale NHS Trust v.
Bland, 2 WLR 316 (1993) (Eng.).
i"2
C. Cassel & D. Meier, Morals and Moralism in the Debate over Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 750, 751 (1990).
"' See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't Health, 497 U.S. 490 (1989).
See also ALAN
MEISEL, THE RIGHT To DIE (1989).
84 See STANDARD OF CARE, supra note 135, at 85-118.
"'See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT (1994);
MARGARET BATTIN, THE LEAST WORST DEATH (1994); Michigan v. Kevorkian, No. 9951, 1994
Mich. LEXIS 3033 (Dec. 13, 1994). In November, 1994, Oregon passed its Ballot Measure
16, which gives legal immunity to physicians prescribing lethal drugs to their competent,
terminally ill patients who request them. See George J. Annas, Prescribing Death: The
DEATH
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cans rightly fear that doctors often ignore their wishes to refuse treatment, and to
have proper medication for pain control near the end of life. Physician surveys
consistently indicate that doctors routinely ignore patient wishes to end treatment,
undermedicate for pain, and continue to see death as professional failure. 186
Jay Katz made many of these points more than a decade ago in his insightful
7
book The Silent World of Doctor and Patient.""
Katz noted that American physicians may fear death even more than their patients. They use silence to protect
themselves from their own fears and to avoid discussing the uncertainties of medical
treatments with their patients. But, as Katz notes, such silence amounts to abandoning the patient, who may suffer more from "premortem loneliness" and isolation than
from the prospect of dying itself.188 If patients and physicians are to communicate
effectively with one another, Katz argues that physicians must learn to share uncertainty with their patients, especially near death. He also argued, as we do, that
honest disclosures "about the elective nature of many treatments-about the benefits of their employment or delay, and about the risks of intervention or delay"
could play a vital role in helping to contain medical costs.' 89
Daniel Callahan has gone even further, and seems correct in asserting that the
U.S. health care system is ultimately driven by an attempt to cope with our own
mortality.' Illness is seen not as leading to inevitable death, but as a challenge to
be overcome. Callahan has compared improvements in medical care with space
exploration, noting that, "No matter how far you go, there's always farther you can
go."'' He believes U.S. society will never accept limits on either medical expenditures or personal autonomy until we learn to accept our own mortality. In his words:
To me, the great question is: How are we going to think about progress in
the future? What kind of progress is genuinely of benefit to people? ...I
think the answer has to be something more complex than the fact that people
get sick and die. For me, the fundamental reality underlying progress is that
no matter how far we go, people are still going to get sick and they are
still going to die. No matter how much money we throw into progress, that
fundamental human reality will remain.'92
Callahan has also said that there are no acceptable causes of death in the U.S.
We set up national institutes of health designed to prevent death from all its leading
causes.93 Ivan Illich argues that in "every society the dominant image of death determines the prevalent concept of health ....A society's image of death reveals the level
of independence of its people, their personal relatedness, self-reliance and aliveness." 94
Illich traces Western civilization's view of death as it has evolved from "God's call,"
Oregon Initiative, 33 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1240 (1994) (hereinafter Prescribing Death].
IB6See, e.g. M. Z. Solomon et al., Decisions Near the End of Life: Professional Views on
Life-Sustaining
Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14 (1993).
7
11 JAY KATZ, THE-SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 219 (1984).

a'Id. at 223, citing Avery D. Weisman & Thomas P. Hackett, Predilection to Death:
Death and Dying as a Psychiatric Problem, 23 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE 232, 250-51 (1961).
119Id. at 228.
" Daniel Callahan, Living Within Limits: The Future of Health Care, 7 TRENDS HEALTH
CARE L. & ETHICS 15, 16 (1992).
191
Id. at 16:
92Id. (emphasis added).
93

' D. CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE: LIVING WITH MORTALITY (1993).
"' IVAN ILLICH, MEDICAL NEMESIS 122 (1975).
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to a natural occurrence, to a force of nature, to an untimely event, to "the outcome of
a specific disease certified by the doctor." In his view, "The hope of doctors to
control the outcome of specific diseases gave rise to the myth that they had power
over death.'" 95 It also fueled their patients' hopes that death could be overcome.
In a market-driven economy, where physicians are producers and patients are
consumers, Illich argues that society permits people to die only when their bodies
"refuse any further input of treatment," after which they "become useless not only
as a producer but also as a consumer... [and] must finally be written off as a total
loss. ' ' 196 In this ICU-maximal-treatment model, "[d]eath has become the ultimate
form of consumer resistance."' 97 Nor is this irrelevant to health care finance. A
young physician who could not prevent the medical brutalization of his dying doctor-father by other U.S. physicians laments: "Our health care system is structured to
meet reimbursement rather than patients' needs. Tremendous amounts of money are
spent prolonging death, not life."'98
Cancer, again, provides a useful example. Even in the United States, effective
standard treatments for most cancers simply do not exist.'99 A 1990 survey, for
example, found that fully one-third of all drugs used on cancer patients are of unproven safety and efficacy for the purpose for which they are administered.2 °° Unapproved use is even more prevalent for malignancies that have metastasized than
for cancers at earlier stages. Oncologist Charles Moertel, commenting on the study,
noted that the major beneficiaries of such unproven and futile approaches are the
"appointment book of the oncologist" and "the pharmaceutical companies and their
stockholders. 2 0 1 In short, business concerns appear to supplant both medical
ethics and patient interests. As to the argument that oncologists are just responding to the demands of dying patients, Moertel rejoins: "This argument abandons
the scientific basis for medical practice and could just as well be used to justify
quackery. Also, one wonders how many patients with advanced pancreatic cancer,
for example, would really demand cytotoxic drugs if the sheer futility of such therapy
'2 2
was honestly explained.
In countries like Japan and the U.K., which do not spend inordinate amounts of
money on health care at the end of life, failure to discuss prognosis seems to be
societally acceptable because death is not viewed as professional defeat. It is
20 3
accepted as both natural and necessary by physicians and their patients alike.
Id. at 140; see also
Ig
196ILLICH,

KATZ,

supra note 187, at 1-79.

supra note 194, at 149.

197Id.

"9INorman Paradis, Making a Living Off the Dying, N.Y.

TIMES,

April 25, 1992, at 23.

99See John C. Bailar III & Elaine M. Smith, Progress Against Cancer?, 314 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1226 (1986); Tim Beardsley, A Way Not Won, Sci. AM., Jan., 1994, at 130.
200Thomas Laetz & George Silberman, Reimbursement Policies Constrain the Practice
of Oncology, 266 JAMA 2996 (1991).
201Charles G. Moertel, Off-Label Drug Use for Cancer Therapy and National Health
Care Priorities,266 JAMA 3031 (1991). See also David V. Schapira et al., Intensive Care,
Survival, and Expenses of Treating Critically Ill Cancer Patients,269 JAMA 783 (1993); Cornelius
0. Granai, Ovarian Cancer-UnrealisticExpectations, 327 NEw ENG. J. MEo. 197 (1992).
202 Moertel, supra note 201, at 3031. On end-of-life medical experiments, see generally George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Human Experimentation: From
Nuremberg to Helsinki and Beyond, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 119 (1992); George J. Annas, Faith
(Healing), Hope and Charity at the FDA: The Politics of AIDS Drug Trials, 34 VILL. L. REv.
771 (1989).
203 Not all Japanese observers agree with this position.
Moreover, a culture's view of
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As Rihito Kamura has explained of Japan, "Death is an integral part of the Japanese
cultural tradition. Most Japanese people resist the modern, technological death in
which machines can supplant important rituals surrounding death and dying. ' 2 4
Because members of these relatively more homogeneous societies share common
perceptions about how much medical intervention is appropriate at the end of life,
comprehensive discussion of treatment alternatives between doctor and patient
seems less necessary.
In the more pluralistic U.S. society, however, there is less social consensus on
the role of medicine toward the end of life, and physician biases toward more aggressive treatment may offend the value systems of many Americans. These people are
going to great lengths, such as executing living wills, petitioning courts to terminate
treatment, and committing suicide, to assert that merely prolonging the dying process is unacceptable to them. 05
Physicians often tend to treat patients with terminal illness aggressively for a
variety of motives, including misplaced fear of civil (or even criminal) litigation if
they do not.206 Their heroic efforts to ward off the inevitable often compromise the
quality of their patients' remaining lives in ways that doctors would rarely elect for
themselves. When physicians impart straightforward information about prognosis,
their patients are enabled to exercise the same degree of informed choice about endof-life care as the doctors would. In such situations, the right to refuse treatment
may be more important to patient self-determination than the ability to demand such
treatment or even to choose among treatment options. Accurate information about
prognosis thus promotes patient autonomy and can save significant health care
expenditures on treatment that patients would decline were they "truly" informed. 07
death may change radically over a short period of time. For example, Naokao Miyaji, see
supra note 176, was kind enough to comment on an early draft of this article. She doubts
that our view of the Japanese attitude towards death is correct and thinks at least in the
post-World War II period "the notion that death should be avoided at all costs is very
prevalent" in Japan. Letter from Naokoa Miyaji to George J. Annas & Frances Miller (June
2, 1993) (on file with authors). If she is correct, we are likely to see an enormous increase in
medical care expenditures in Japan as its physicians adopt the expensive technological
interventions used so freely in the U.S. and encourage their use. See infra Figure 3 at page 392.
204 Rihito Kimura, Anencephalic Organ Donation: A Japanese Case, 14 J. MED. & PHIL.
97, 100 (1989). Kimura cites the Japanese text of EMIKO NAMIHIRA, CULTURE OF ILLNESS AND
DEATH (1990) to support his conclusions.
205 See Prescribing Death, supra note 185. It also seems fair to conclude that physicians are at least as afraid of death as their patients are, and much more likely to view death
as a professional defeat. See supra note 202 and sources cited therein; see also P.C.
Thauberger & E.M. Thauberger, A Consideration of Death and a Sociological Perspective
of the Quality of the Dying Patient's Care, 8 Soc. ScL. & MED. 437 (1974). In one study
where twenty-four severely burned patients were told that survival with their degree of
burns was unprecedented, twenty-one of them and/or their families chose nonheroic treatment. Sharon H. Imbus & Bruce E. Zawacki, Autonomy for Burned Patients When Survival
Is Unprecedented, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 308 (1977).
206Physicians' economic self-interest often reinforces this preference for heroic treatment. See generally RoDwIN, supra note 162.
21 The amount that could be saved is not known, has been variously calculated, and is
dependent upon one's assumptions. See Singer & Lowy, supra note 58, at 478 (arguing,
based on study showing 70 percent of people would refuse life sustaining treatment if
incompetent and with poor prognosis, that up to $109 billion of medical care could be saved
each year if everyone in U.S. executed a living will expressing that preference, and these
requests were honored.) Others put possible savings much more modestly, at about $20
billion annually. Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 58, at 540.
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If we are correct, a country's overall health care expenditures can be strongly
influenced by the amount of honest prognosis information made available to patients. Assuming that sophisticated and expensive medical technology is available,
Figure 3 impressionistically summarizes the relationship between prognosis information and health care expenditures.
The U.S. is now at the point marked A on this chart, but we hypothesize that,
with more open and honest prognostic information, it could move back down to A'.
Japan, with increasing emphasis on technology and more openness about treatment
alternatives, could move up from B to B'. The U.K., now at C, could stay constant
(point C') notwithstanding more prognosis information because of global budgeting
constraints. The U.K. could also shift its entire curve upward to C" if more information about prognosis and alternatives' generates pressure for more government investment in health service delivery, particularly high technology.
The recent United States emphasis on outcomes data could produce both better
informed patients and savings in medical expenditures, so long as outcomes research is carried out with scientific integrity.2" 8 These studies identify treatments
and procedures falling into a variety of efficacy categories, and can also pinpoint
those providers delivering substandard or unduly expensive care. They also can
evaluate patient satisfaction with medical care and its results. "Never beneficial" or
futile treatments, or those delivered by providers deficient in skills or cost effectiveness, will-or arguably should if insurance subsidy is involved-be simply eliminated from the medical care system.
John Wennberg has correctly suggested that patients are the ones who should
make the real final treatment choices, based in large measure on a personal evaluation of outcomes and other prognosis data, as applied to the length and quality of
their own lives.2" 9 An early Wennberg study showed that many Maine urologists
did prostate surgery primarily to relieve symptoms (such as having to get up in the
middle of the night to urinate), rather than to prevent progression When patients
themselves were queried, however, their attitudes toward their symptoms varied.
Some patients were not bothered much by the symptoms at all. Patients also differed
from their doctors in assessing the significance of treatment risks, "particularly
surgery-induced impotence and operative mortality."21
The key to reducing variations, in Wennberg's opinion, thus depends not on
learning more from laboratory findings or clinical exams, but rather "depends on
learning what patients want, and this can only be ascertained by asking patients ...
[who should be informed] that they indeed have a choice and that their choice
should depend on their own preferences ..
2 When fully informed of the risks
and benefits, only one of five severely symptomatic men actually chose the prostate
surgery their doctors recommended.2"2
28 On outcomes research generally, see J. Jarrett Clinton, Outcomes Research-A Way to

Improve Medical Practice, 266 JAMA 2057 (1991); John E. Wennberg, Outcomes Research,
Cost Containment, and the Fear of Health Care Rationing, 323 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
209John A. Wennberg, AHCPR and the Strategy for Health Care Reform, HEALTH AFF.,
Winter 1992, at 67, 68 [hereinafter Strategy for Health Care Reform]. See also Craig
Fleming et al., A Decision Analysis of Alternative Treatment Strategies for Clinically Localized Prostate Cancer, 269 JAMA 2650 (1993).
2' Strategy for Health Care Reform, supra note 209, at 69.
211Id.

2 Id.

Studies of patient preferences regarding quality of life versus increased changes
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THE EMPIRE OF DEATH
VI. CONCLUSION
Our cover story in the U.S. is autonomy. But the payment system, reinforced by
fear of death, is actually the dominant force driving the American health sector." 3
The United States is said to have the best health care system in the world, but only
the wealthy and well-insured can afford to have access to all that modern medicine
can provide. As we have seen, enjoying such access in ignorance of likely outcomes is at best a mixed blessing. Because of the crushing costs and our almost
unique preoccupation with avoiding (or at least delaying) death, this "best" system
is not sought after by any other country in the world. Our system is nonexportable
precisely because of its expense. Although the payment system for medical services
and attitudes toward death also drive the health care systems of Japan and the U.K.,
they have driven them in different directions.
A society's cultural beliefs concerning death influence health resource allocation, and will be reflected in a country's informed consent laws. Where individualism is highly prized and medical care is seen as a market good, legal doctrine will
place a high premium on information disclosure to facilitate patient/consumer choices,
especially among treatment alternatives. Countries like the U.K. and Japan with
more collective notions about health care, and where citizens are more likely to defer
to authority, will be less interested in choice and thus less inclined to emphasize full
disclosure or truth-telling. Instead the content of disclosure will generally be discretionary with physicians.
Nonetheless, informed consent probably gets more attention than it deserves
with regard to treatment alternatives. Physicians everywhere in fact usually make
decisions about therapy for their patients rather than with them. This may be inevitable given information asymmetry and patient dependence, and may be what even
American courts mean when they designate the doctor-patient relationship as a
"trust" or fiduciary relationship. 1 4 The medical profession does get to set its own
standards for practice in the last analysis, and for most diseases physician treatment
preferences affect the manner in which information is conveyed to their patients.
The doctor's ability to shade information may be as or more important than the

of longer term survival also support the proposition that patients value quality of life more
than quantity. See, e.g., Barbara J. McNeil et al., Speech and Survival: Tradeoffs Between
Quality and Quantity of Life in Laryngeal Cancer, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 982 (1981);
Barbara J. McNeil et al., Fallacy of the Five-Year Survival in Lung Cancer, 299 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1397 (1978).
2'3 The most egregious example of this point is set forth in Grace Plaza v. Elbaum, 588
N.Y.S.2d 853 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), aff'd and certified question answered, 623 N.E.2d
513 (N.Y. 1993). A New York Court of Appeals, which had previously ruled that Jean
Elbaum had left clear and convincing evidence that she never wanted tube feeding if she
were in a persistent vegetative state, nonetheless required her husband to pay for more than
a year of such treatment (in excess of $100,000) even though her nursing home had
informed him (before he sued to enjoin treatment) that "'even if irrefutable evidence of
the patient's wishes were forthcoming, Grace Plaza is not willing to undertake removal of
the gastrostomy tube .... .'
588 N.Y.S.2d at 863. With such outrageous medical and
judicial acts, no form of national health insurance can be affordable. See George J. Annas,
Adding Injustice to Injury: Compulsory Payment for Unwanted Treatment, 327 NEw ENo. J.
MED. 1885 (1992).
214Lambert v. Park, 597 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1976). See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman,
Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care
Providers, 51 U. PiTT. L. REV. 365 (1990).
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content of the disclosure itself. Thus, patients may end up with little real choice
among treatment alternatives.
Choice, at least the choice to forgo treatment altogether, seems to be most
contested and most necessary at the end of life. In Japan, where few or no heroic
efforts are made to prolong the life of dying patients, there is little interest in the
right to die movement. In the U.S., however, following cases like those of Karen Ann
Quinlan and Nancy Cruzan, the right to refuse treatment is central to the self-determination debate, and is likely to be dominant in future resource allocation controversies as well." 5 With this in mind, taking informed consent more seriously with
regard to prognosis should help to make health systems more responsive to the true
preferences of their respective patient populations.
There is no justification for forcing unwanted, expensive, and useless treatment
on citizens at life's end. Nor will most patients demand futile, painful and expensive
therapy once they are fully informed of the consequences. Thus, informed consent,
especially regarding the truth about prognosis, may be the only way the U.S. can
limit the use of expensive and ineffective treatment at the end of life consistent with
cultural expectations about patient autonomy. It may also be one of the few ways we
can avoid massive new expenditures and still underwrite universal health insurance.
We opened this Article with some thoughts from a British writer. We close with
the views of an American one. John Updike has observed, America is a victim not of
limits, but of dreams: "There is no enough. That's one of the words Americans have
a very hard time learning: the word enough."21 This is probably why Updike ends
his Rabbit books with Rabbit, responding to his son's cries of "Don't die, Dad,
don't," by saying, "'Well, Nelson ... all I can tell you is, it isn't so bad.' Rabbit
thinks he should maybe say more, the kid looks so wildly expectant, but enough.
Maybe. Enough."2 7

21 Given the differences between Japan and the U.S., it is striking that, concerning

incompetent patients, the two most important U.S. decisions upholding the right to refuse
treatment, In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept.
Health, 497 U.S. 490 (1989), both center on attempts to give the patient's family ultimate
decision-making authority. One can see U.S. jurisprudence-at least where incompetent
patients are involved-reaching for the Japanese family-centered model of health care
decision making. Regardless of the law, however, U.S. physicians have traditionally made
decisions for incompetent patients in conjunction with their families, with no court proceedings whatsoever.
26 Quoted in Dennis Farney, Novelist Updike Sees a Nation Frustrated by its Own
Dreams,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1992, at Al, A8.
27
1 JOHN UPDIKE, RABBIT AT REST 512 (1990). See also Christopher Ricks, BECKErr's DYING
WORDS 1 (1995): "Most people most of the time want to live for ever. This truth is
acknowledged in literature . . . . But like many a truth, it is a half-truth . . . . For, after all,
most people some of the time, and some people most of the time, do not want to live for
ever."; and WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS, THE WESTERN LANDS 257 (1987), who ends his book on our
search for immortality by asking, "How long does it take a man to learn that he does not,
cannot want what he 'wants'?"

